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ABSTRACT 
For decades, the assumption underlying various development initiatives has been that economic 
growth and social prosperity can be achieved through the growth of labor-intensive industry, 
such as manufacturing, thus resulting in the employment of otherwise unemployed individuals.  
In South Africa, government agencies seem to surmise this same assumption and derive their 
development plans from it.  This thesis challenges this assumption and explores the relationship 
between the future of labor in South African manufacturing and the integration of automation 
technology into the manufacturing sector.  This thesis finds that automating process chains in the 
manufacturing sector may displace labor by implementing labor-saving technologies in South 
African firms, but also by placing the competitive advantage in manufacturing to countries more 
prepared for technological change.  In this thesis, I find the South African demographic most 
susceptible to job displacement in this sector is low or semi-skilled, young, black males.  I 
suggest a number of policy responses, including skills-upgrading initiatives and a redistribution 
of some gains achieved through automating processes to those displaced, as a part of an 
enhanced social net. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 Inherent in a range of development philosophies, projects, and scholarship is the notion 
that tapping into Africa’s abundant supply of labor is a viable path out of poverty for the 
continent.  In an effort to create jobs and leverage this abundance of labor, scholars and 
politicians alike have endorsed policies to promote growth in labor-intensive industries such as 
manufacturing.  Development economists such as Söderbom and Teal (2003), for example, argue 
that the labor-intensive nature of manufacturing provides Africa an opportunity to increase 
exports, create jobs, and reduce poverty simultaneously.  Bhorat et al. (2016) stated that, “No 
country, to date, has managed to transition out of a middle-income to a high-income country 
status, without the dynamism of a vibrant, labour-intensive [sic] manufacturing industry.”  In the 
public sphere, the government of South Africa, for example, sees future manufacturing jobs as an 
integral component of its economic and social development (Department of Trade and Industry, 
2015; Department of Trade and Industry, 2017).  These noble aspirations share the assumption 
that the future of labor-intensive industry runs hand-in-hand with future jobs.  In the face of 
continuously improving automation technologies, however, these assumptions are suspect, and 
such suspicions should behoove the international development community to examine the 
relationship between the future of industry and labor. 
 South Africa is a paragon example of an African country that should consider this 
relationship.  Its government has consistently pointed to manufacturing as an important source of 
new jobs for the country.  In 2015, for example, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
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enshrined the position of manufacturing as a job-creator into its Industrial Policy Action Plan 
(IPAP).  Two years later, the DTI’s 2017 annual report states as one of its strategic objectives: 
“Grow the manufacturing sector to promote industrial development, job creation, investment and 
export.”  And in addition to the push for future jobs in manufacturing, the industry in South 
Africa is already crucial to its labor force and economy.  In June 2017, approximately 1,799,000 
people were employed in the manufacturing sector, constituting just under 11.2 percent of the 
country’s total employment1 (Statistics South Africa b, 2017). 
Labor in the manufacturing sector is clearly of great importance to South Africa.  But the 
nation’s job-creation plans, when viewed in the context of automation, expose potentially serious 
problems with the country’s development strategy.  In its current state, automation technology 
has the capacity to automate aspects of sundry manufacturing jobs that already exist, and this 
capacity continues to grow (Maynika et al., 2017).  For example, Volkswagen assembly lines in 
South Africa have already automated processes to assemble doors, panels, bumpers, wheels, and 
batteries (Gorlach & Wessel, 2007).  Looking forward, developments in the capability and 
availability of 3-D printing technology allow for decentralized and streamlined manufacturing 
with fewer production components (World Economic Forum, 2017).  It is thus evident that the 
security of both current and future jobs in South African manufacturing should be examined in 
depth, along with the policies necessary to address the findings. 
 In this thesis I will explore the relationship between automation and the future of labor in 
the South African manufacturing industry, and the policies relevant to this relationship.  This 
thesis has been designed to sequentially move toward suggesting policies that contribute to the 
welfare of South Africans employed in the manufacturing sector.  The thesis has four main 
                                                          
1
 This estimate includes both formal and informal labor. 
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sections.  The first section is a literature review.  The next section will make approximations for 
the potential for integration of automation technologies into existing production lines in South 
African manufacturing, and the likelihood that these advances will result in job displacement.  It 
will then explore the socio-demographic characteristics of those employed in the industry, and 
will lastly leverage this information, in the context of the potential for job displacement, in order 
to suggest policies aimed at facilitating advances in South African manufacturing which both 
promote the nation’s competitiveness and protect the welfare of its laborers. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Job-content change and job displacement due to technological innovation are nothing 
new.  As early as 1930, John Maynard Keynes (1930) introduced the term technological 
unemployment: unemployment due to technological improvements economizing labor faster 
than new jobs can be created.  In 1955, the United States Congress held a hearing on automation 
and technological change where Ford
2
 discussed the machinery used in automobile 
manufacturing plants to automate assembly lines.  Ford defined automation as "the automatic 
handling of parts between progressive production processes.”  A more modernized definition 
came in 1997, when Parasuraman and Riley defined automation as the execution by a machine 
agent of a function previously carried out by a human.  He noted, unlike many others preceding 
him, that this process usually involves a computer.  This thesis will adopt Parasuraman and 
Riley’s definition of automation. 
 Job displacement due to technological change is a recurrent theme from the industrial 
revolution to the present day.  The Luddite Movement is often referenced as an example of what 
can go wrong when jobs are displaced by machines.  In the early 19
th
 century, groups of 
disgruntled handicraftsman, who came to be called the Luddites, rioted across parts of England 
in defiance of the textile machinery that replaced their labor, resulting in the Luddites destroying 
many of these machines (“Luddite,” 2013).  Now, certain textile manufacturers are using robotic 
sewing machines that stitch fabrics together and dexterously move fabric between machines for 
further stitching, which some predict will lead to substantial job losses in this industry (Chang & 
                                                          
2
 The automobile manufacturer 
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Huynh, 2016).  But job displacement does not mean unemployment.  At the beginning of the 20
th
 
century, for example, agriculture accounted for 40 percent of the jobs in the United States.  Just 
over a century later, in 2010, agriculture employed only 2 percent of American workers (Autor, 
2014), yet over the course of the year, the unemployment rate never exceeded 10 percent 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017).  The recurrence of job displacement due to technological 
change throughout history, however, does not necessarily mean that the future will follow the 
same trends as the past.  In theory, job duties can evolve within existing job categories in 
coordination with technological change.  Whether or not the effect of technological change on 
employment will manifest in this fashion is subject to debate, and will be considered by this 
thesis. 
In the present day, the range of tasks that automated robots and computer programs can 
perform is growing.  In their seminal work, Frey and Osbourne (2017) showed how more 
sensitive sensors and greater dexterity allow industrial robots to not only complete routine, 
iterative movements, but non-routine manual tasks that require a broadening spectrum of actions.  
Some of this broadening can reduce the need for human employment.  A McKinsey & Company 
analysis found that with existing technologies, at least 5 percent of occupations worldwide are 
fully automatable (Manyika et al., 2017).  Computer capabilities in complex communication and 
pattern recognition, for example, can cause companies to hire fewer employees because 
computers can perform tasks previously carried out by humans (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2012).  
Furthermore, the current state of automation technology is not static.  Scholars such as Jämsä-
Jounela (2007) have argued that trends in the development and use of automation technology 
point to a continued expansion of applications and will become increasingly more important in 
process chains. 
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Automation plays a role in the type of labor demanded.  Autor et al. (2003) have argued 
that the changes in job content that favor educated labor have been prompted by technological 
change.  They noted that the correlation between labor demand shifts and technological 
innovation is clear, albeit not explicitly causal.  After a rigorous analysis, however, Autor et al. 
maintain that technological change can be considered a causal factor in shifts in labor demand 
toward educated labor.  Earlier, in their formative work, Autor et al. (1998) have argued that the 
growing need for educated labor is greater as companies utilize computers more, which also 
creates a labor demand shift toward educated labor.  This trend has been recognized by 
governments as well.  For example, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ December 2015 monthly 
review stated that, “the jobs in manufacturing tend to be computer based,” and that there is a 
need for employees who can program computers rather than work assembly lines.  The trailing 
question is whether or not the same laborers who previously worked the assembly lines will 
become the computer programmers.  And if not, what will be their means of livelihood in the 
intuitively likely scenario that they, instead of becoming the programmers, are left jobless when 
automation progressively, or perhaps from the laborer’s perspective, insidiously, replaces their 
job duties. 
The 2016 World Economic Forum (WEF) publication “The Future of Jobs” also made a 
strong case that technological change will necessitate investments in upgrading employee skills 
and emphasized a general trend on the demand side of the labor market toward high-skilled and 
technical labor.  The report stated that this trend is expected to lead to a “transformation of 
manufacturing into a highly sophisticated sector where high-skilled engineers are in strong 
demand.”  The report published the results of a 2015 WEF survey of chief human resources 
officers and other company leadership from firms across nine industry sectors in fifteen 
 
 
7 
 
developed and developing countries.  The respondents represented 13,549,000 employees 
worldwide.  The survey asked a series of questions pertaining to technological change and the 
future of work. 
The survey results reflect some of the investigations explored earlier.  Of the respondents, 
nine percent reported that robotics and autonomous transport were the biggest drivers of 
technological change, and seven percent chose artificial intelligence (AI).  When asked to choose 
the most significant barriers to change, 37 percent of respondents said that workforce strategies 
were not aligned with innovation strategies.  Further, 65 percent of respondents noted that their 
companies are currently pursuing strategies that invest in reskilling employees.  The WEF 
echoed these themes in a 2017 white paper “Technology and Innovation for the Future of 
Production: Accelerating Value Creation.” 
As the landscape of the labor market continues to change in the face of computing and 
automation, new challenges require further analysis.  It is apparent that not only can automation 
open new job categories, but that it has the potential to displace a significant portion of the 
existing labor force.  Some estimates put at least 47 percent of US jobs at high risk of automation 
over the next two decades (Frey & Osbourne, 2017) and 49 percent worldwide (Manyika et at., 
2017).  More conservative estimates put 9 percent of all jobs in OECD countries at risk of 
automation (Arntz et al., 2016).  On a global scale, McKinsey & Company estimates that 1.1 
billion employees could have their jobs automated by adapting currently existing technologies, 
and that manufacturing jobs are especially vulnerable (Manyika et al., 2017). 
This does not imply, however, that these jobs cannot or will not be replaced in some other 
capacity.  For example, Autor and Dorn (2013) have linked the growth of low-skilled service 
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jobs to the decline of easily automatable jobs such as those in manufacturing.  Autor (2015) later 
maintained that some middle-skill jobs will continue to exist despite the automation of many of 
their tasks.  Further, some scholars have argued that increased productivity in manufacturing has 
led to higher demand, lower prices, and increased overall employment within the manufacturing 
industry (Nordhaus, 2005).  Others have contended that following a recession, job losses from 
technological change in routine-based jobs have seldom been replaced even as productivity 
recovers (Jaimovich & Siu, 2012). 
Moreover, there is no consensus on whether current trends in job losses in the 
manufacturing sector are primarily due to improvements in technology, offshoring, or a 
combination of these and other factors.  (Katz & Autor, 1999; Goos et al., 2009; Blinder, 2006; 
Rowthorn & Ramaswamy, 1997; Williams et al., 2014; Nordhaus, 2015).  In his recent but 
influential work, Rodrik (2015), for example, argues that the shrinking size of global 
manufacturing employment has a different set of causes in advanced and developing countries.  
He maintains that technology is a more prominent factor in advanced economies, and that 
globalization and trade are the main culprits of job losses since the 1970s in developing 
countries.  The extent to which automation is responsible for previous net job losses in 
manufacturing is unclear.  But the aim of this thesis is not to determine the cause of job losses in 
manufacturing where they have already occurred, but to analyze policies that can mitigate the 
deleterious effects of future job losses due to automation in South African manufacturing.  To do 
so, it will be necessary to explore automation in the context of the South African manufacturing 
industry. 
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Automation in South Africa 
 The population of South Africa in 2016 was roughly 55.6 million (Statistics South Africa 
f, 2016).  In the second Quarter of 2017, a total of 16,100,000 South Africans were employed, 
including both formal and informal employment (Statistics South Africa b, 2017).  Of those 
employed, approximately 1,799,000 were employed in manufacturing, both formal and informal, 
which accounts for nearly 11.2 percent of the total workforce (Statistics South Africa b, 2017). 
 The South African Government sees its manufacturing sector as an integral component of 
both its economy and employment structure (Department of Trade and Industry, 2015; 
Department of Trade and Industry, 2017; Kaplan, 2004).  The government’s recognition of this 
importance dates as far back as the Tariff Act of 1925, which, in an effort to create a market for 
domestically manufactured products through import substitution, placed tariffs ranging from 20 
to 25 percent on foreign goods (Schneider, 2000).  More recently, in 2015, the DTI released its 
International Policy Action Plan (IPAP), setting the agenda for the future of manufacturing in the 
country.  Among its objectives are increasing exports in “labour-intensive” [sic] manufacturing 
and job creation.  Simultaneously, the plan places a heavy emphasis on technological innovation 
across the industry.  In its 2008 to 2018 ten-year plan to move South Africa toward a knowledge-
based economy, the Department of Science and Technology reiterates the theme of technological 
innovation.  Put in the context of automation, this clearly raises questions about the parallel 
objectives of increasing labor-intensive manufacturing and investing in technological innovation. 
 In Bhorat and Rooney’s paper “State of Manufacturing in South Africa” (2017), the 
authors found that from 2001 to 2014, South African management jobs in the manufacturing 
industry grew at a rate four times the overall employment in the industry.  The same period saw 
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the net creation of 59,000 highly-skilled manufacturing jobs, while losing 82,728 jobs in total 
employment across the industry.  This trend appears to be consistent with global industry trends 
toward high-skilled and away from semi-skilled labor discussed earlier.  Bhorat and Rooney 
(2017) also found that approximately 9,000 unskilled manufacturing jobs were created over this 
period.  This is consistent with the findings of Goos et al. (2009), who observed the same “job 
polarization” trends in Europe, where high-skilled and low-skilled jobs were disproportionately 
created relative to jobs in manufacturing and clerical work involved in routine tasks, which, in 
fact, has been experiencing losses since the 1970s.  Goos et al. argued that that the evidence 
pointed to technological change as the primary cause, consistent with the findings of Autor et al. 
(2003). 
A four-month study in a South African manufacturing plant provides further evidence for 
the existence of this trend.  Hagedorn-Hansen et al. (2017) conducted a study comparing two 
manufacturing cells that produced an aluminum anti-vibration dampener component of vehicle 
suspension arms.  One cell was fitted with additional machinery to automate the process chain, 
and was considered an automated cell.  The other was considered semi-automated.  The study 
found that not only was the automated cell more productive and that it yielded higher profit 
margins, but that only one unskilled laborer was needed to operate five automated cells.  In the 
semi-automated cell, one semi-skilled laborer was required per cell, and the cell could not 
continue to operate during breaks.  At least for this particular process chain, automation resulted 
in higher profit margins and the need for one unskilled laborer at the expense of five semi-skilled 
laborers. 
Another study analyzed the automation levels of three Volkswagen assembly lines in 
Germany and South Africa (Gorlach & Wessel, 2007).  It found that although automation can in 
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many cases be more costly than labor per assembly unit, a low automation level is the primary 
reason for poor product quality.  The study found that relatively high levels of automation are 
optimal when low skill levels and lack of motivation are present.  Out of the three assembly lines 
the study examined, the authors suggested higher levels of automation in the South African 
assembly line than the two in Germany, stating low skill levels and high margins for error as 
reasons. 
Automation is also expanding vertically in South Africa, from the manufacturing of 
products to the exportation of those products at the port.  Automated straddle carriers are large, 
self-driving container transports that both move freight containers between locations and stack 
them vertically.  In the Durban Container Terminal, these machines are replacing human-
operated container transports.  The benefits to the terminal have been savings in labor costs, 
increased efficiency, fewer collisions, and longer equipment lifespans (Nakker, 2015).  
Automation has to some extent impacted and will continue to impact South Africa, and this 
thesis will later explore the nature and degree of that impact in Chapter Four. 
The Social Impact of Automation 
In the 1958 article “Of Things to Come, Automation and Counseling,” Hart and Lifton 
warn of the coming need for psycho-therapy counselors to deal with the dissatisfaction, 
alcoholism, drug use, and other social ills caused by job displacement due to automation.  
Whether or not their fears came to fruition is a matter of debate, but what is clear is that 
automation has the potential to cause social changes, both positive and negative.  The literature 
points to a number of these positive changes.  Among them are rising wages, increased 
participation of women in the workforce, more leisure time and the development of meaningful 
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leisure activities, and an abundance of material goods (Badishkanian et al., 2016; Black & Spitz-
Oener, 2007; Autor a, 2015).  One study in Germany, for example, found that women’s 
participation in non-routine jobs has increased as a result of technological developments, and the 
authors argue that this observation applies to other countries (Black & Spitz-Oener, 2007). 
But there is another side to the social impact of automation.  As explicated earlier, 
automation can lead to job displacement, which has been linked to a range of social tribulations 
(Brand, 2015).  Burgard et al. (2007) observed that job displacement has a statistically significant 
effect on depression.  Further, Sullivan and Water (2009) found that not only do mortality rates 
sharply increase among the recently displaced, but that the risk of death hazards among job-
displaced individuals persists as far as twenty years after displacement.  Put in the context of 
recent findings that there has been an increase in mortality rates for white, non-Hispanic men in 
the United States (Case & Deaton, 2015) labeled by some as “deaths by despair” (Scutchfield & 
Keck, 2017), these trends should be concerning.  Further, the economic effects of job 
displacement can be long lasting.  Eliason and Storrie (2006) found that job losses resulted in 
lower long-term earnings in Europe and the United States.  Clearly job displacement, caused by 
automation or otherwise, has potential be detrimental to individuals if their welfare is derived by 
no other means than the occupation in which they were previously employed. 
As discussed earlier, some scholars argue that under certain circumstances, job 
displacement due to technological change leads to unemployment (Jaimovich & Siu, 2012).  
Although job displacement is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for unemployment, the 
link is intuitive.  The social issues associated with unemployment in a country have been studied 
in depth.  Because automation may well lead to unemployment among those displaced, 
unemployment’s effects on society at large should be examined as well. 
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Unemployment has been linked to higher rates of certain types of crimes (Raphael & 
Winter-Ebmer, 1999).  In South Africa specifically, Demombynes and Özler (2005) have shown 
that crimes such as armed robbery and murder have been significantly correlated with 
unemployment.  The World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report also noted a clear link not 
only between unemployment and crime, but youth unemployment and likeliness to join gangs, 
rebellions, or participate in social upheavals.  In South Africa, in the second quarter of 2017, the 
country’s unemployment rate was 27.7 percent 3  (Statistics South Africa b, 2017).  Surely, 
already high levels of unemployment compounded by potential job losses due to automation of 
the manufacturing sector pose a considerable risk to the social welfare of the country. 
Inequality can also be exacerbated by automation.  This can be a result of the job 
displacement discussed earlier, but also a result of one of the benefits of automation: rising 
wages.  The increasing demand for high-skilled labor can lead to income inequality by 
contributing to wage polarization (Hemous & Olsen, 2016).  In the broader picture, inequality 
can grow between regions and generations.  Cities with higher incomes are generally less 
susceptible to the automation of human labor than cities with pervasive low or semi-skilled, 
labor-intensive industry (Badishkanian et al., 2016).  This can lead to agglomerations of high-
skilled labor in regional hubs, while cities with traditionally labor-intensive industries, such as 
Detroit or Dhaka, lose out.  Furthermore, Sachs and Kotlikoff (2012) found that low-skilled labor 
is generally concentrated in younger generations, and that these demographics are less likely to 
benefit from automation and AI.  These trends were investigated in depth by Benzell et al. 
(2015), who drew similar conclusions. 
                                                          
3
 This estimate was calculated by Statistics South Africa by conducting 30,000 private household surveys, with 
households weighted for extrapolation.  An unemployed person is an individual capable of work that at some point 
in the preceding four weeks, from the time of the survey, has actively sought work, but has not worked during that 
time (Wilkinson, 2017). 
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In 2014, Pew Research Center conducted a poll of 1,896 experts in AI and robotics.  
Although there was no consensus among the respondents, the number of experts close to these 
technologies who expressed fears of a “breakdown of social order” is staggering.  Of the 
respondents, 48 percent said that by 2025, robots will displace more jobs than are created.  One 
respondent, NASA Program Manager Mark Nall, predicted that the coming changes in 
automation technology will be unlike previous technological developments, stating, “Due to their 
versatility and growing capabilities, not just a few economic sectors will be affected, but whole 
swaths will be.  This is already being seen now in areas from robocalls to lights-out 
manufacturing.
4
  Economic efficiency will be the driver.  The social consequence is that good-
paying jobs will be increasingly scarce.” 
But what does the potential for social disruptions due to automation mean for South 
Africa?  According to some metrics, South Africa already suffers from some of the highest levels 
of inequality in the world (The World Bank, 2017).  In 2015, the income per capita Gini 
coefficient was 0.68 (Statistics South Africa c, 2017).  South Africa’s DTI acknowledges the 
gravity of the inequality in the country, stating in its 2015 IPAP, “This is very significant 
because growing inequality is not only a threat to social wellbeing, stability and cohesion, but 
also undermines domestic demand and therefore the possibilities for expanded economic 
growth.” 
Policy Responses to Automation 
 In a 2016 policy brief, “Robots and Industrialization in Developing Countries,” the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) warned that the robotic 
                                                          
4
 Manufacturing facilities operating at 100 percent automation, where lights are, literally or hyperbolically, turned 
off because human labor is not present. 
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substitution of human labor may cause the appeal of offshoring to developing countries to wane, 
and that some re-shoring to developed countries has already occurred in manufacturing activities 
where automation is a key factor.  The brief makes a number of policy suggestions for 
developing countries, including a sustained increase in the share of wages, redesigning the 
education system to reflect the needs of industry, and fostering interdependency in domestic 
production by advantaging intra-sectoral and cross-sectoral industry, making re-shoring more 
difficult. 
 The international public sector consistently reiterates these policy suggestions for 
developing countries.  The World Bank’s 2016 Flagship Report, “Digital Dividends,” discussed 
the growth of digital, computer, and automation technologies as both a challenge and opportunity 
for developing countries.  It provided a number of policy suggestions to emerging economies.  It 
advised that policies should aim to improve educational environments, encourage research and 
development, strengthen cooperation between private sector, government, and educational 
institutions, and teach digital skills such as coding.  Further, a 2015 OECD policy brief on South 
Africa stated in reference to the South African labor market, “With low quality, low status and 
low labour [sic] market relevance, the system is ill-prepared to address the needs of the country’s 
burgeoning youth population.”  In a list of suggestions to policy makers, the brief recommends 
expanding early childhood education, enhancing the equity and efficiency of resource use in the 
education system, improving labor market relevance, and developing vocational and work-based 
learning systems. 
 These policy recommendations are also common in academic spheres.  One study in 
Turkey (Srour et al., 2013) examined the skill gap in the Turkish manufacturing sector from 
1980 to 2001.  The authors found that domestic and imported technologies caused a rise in 
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demand for skilled labor five to six times higher than the demand for unskilled labor.  They 
recommended that developing countries couple trade liberalization with policies that increase the 
supply of domestic skilled labor.  Autor (b, 2015), as well, points out the importance of human 
capital investments and educating labor forces on the skills that complement technological 
changes.  Even the South African DTI’s 2016/2017 Annual Report places a strong emphasis on 
skills development.  But is the reskilling of the entire labor force displaced by automation a 
realistic expectation, especially in a country already struggling to meet its educational 
objectives?  Surely, policies that recognize the effect of technological change on the labor force 
should not only aim to raise the skill levels of employees, but to mitigate the potential harm to 
those who could be left behind. 
 In addition to discussing the policies necessary to reskill employees, Autor (a, 2015) 
breaks down the “paradox of abundance.”  He cautions that the reassurances of some economists 
are losing their effect, and that subsets of the labor force will see sharp falls in participation.  He 
argues that the challenge won’t be employment, but how to distribute the abundance that results 
from the increased production capacities due to automation.  The nature of that distribution will 
be determined by policy, and some scholars have provided policy options that will leverage the 
wealth created by higher efficiencies to promote the wellbeing of those not directly benefitting 
from that wealth.  Sachs and Kotlikoff (2012), for example, argue that wealth gains due to 
automation will generally end up in the hands of older generations whose skill sets are 
advantaged by the changing labor market.  They propose a tax-and-transfer policy that taxes the 
gains of older generations and uses them to advance the welfare of younger generations.  This 
intergenerational wealth-transfer policy does not specify how tax revenue will be used to 
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promote the welfare of the youth, but one can infer that revenues might be used to execute some 
of the education-based policy initiatives recommended by the international public sector. 
 As Sachs and Kotlikoff suggested, a tax on those who benefit from automation may be 
necessary.  The social net that absorbs the impact of labor market shocks, however, may have to 
be strengthened in more than one dimension.   One possible policy solution is a universal basic 
income (UBI).  A UBI is an unconditional, guaranteed grant provided to each citizen of a country 
on an individual basis (Parijs, 2004).  This idea has been proposed by figures as far to the right as 
Milton Freidman, in the form of a “negative income tax” (Friedman & Friedman, 1982), and 
likewise by traditionally left-leaning economists such as Robert Reich (Reich, 2017).  
 In the paper, “Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the Twenty-first Century,” 
Parijs (2004) provides a detailed account of what a UBI is, and what it is not.  This thesis will 
understand UBI in the context of the parameters set by Parijs.  To summarize, a UBI is paid by a 
government, to a set of specified individuals, on a consistent, regular basis.  The set of 
individuals to which a UBI is paid is a subject of debate, as children, refugees, migrants, inmates, 
etc. add considerations.  Generally, however, all law-abiding citizens of a country should be 
eligible, and considerations should be taken to accommodate for individuals providing for 
children
5
.  The methods by which a UBI pools funds to redistribute are variable, and it is unclear 
how such funds would be gathered or created in South Africa in particular. 
 The concept of UBI in South Africa has some political support already, (Matisonn & 
Seekings, 2002), and the nation has a social welfare grant (SWG) program that has strong 
conceptual overlaps with a UBI.  Makino (2004) argues that the combination of structural 
                                                          
5
 This will be explored in depth in Chapter ___ in the context of South African society. 
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unemployment and a well-established system of SWGs make UBI, or in her terms, a Basic 
Income Grant (BIG), an ideal policy fit for South Africa.  Some scholars argue, however, that 
such an approach is too broad and conceptual (Wispelaere & Stirton, 2004), and that there would 
likely be serious issues with implementation (Wispelaere & Stirton, 2012). 
 Despite criticisms, often from the right, research on South Africa’s existing SWG 
program provides support for Makino’s argument.  One qualitative study (Surender et al., 2010) 
that conducted 39 focus groups with 386 individuals found that, contrary to the observations of 
opponents of SWGs in South Africa, lack of motivation did not appear to be a significant factor 
driving joblessness.  Structural conditions in the labor market were considered the primary 
reason.  Another mixed method study (Neves et al., 2009) found that in addition to alleviating 
poverty, social grants galvanize the informal labor market, enable households to invest in 
productive assets, and allow recipients to save.  Because SWGs in South Africa could be a model 
for policies that absorb the social impact of automation, or even the foundation for an augmented 
SWG scheme, they will be further examined in Chapter Six. 
 The potential for automation in the South African manufacturing sector to bring forth or 
exacerbate serious social problems does not entail the actualization of these problems.  By 
carefully considering the industries and demographics within the manufacturing sector that are 
likely to be affected and responding with well-fitting policies, the improvements in productivity 
from automation may actually provide a major net positive for the welfare of the nation.  But it 
cannot be ignored that South Africa has historically been plagued with its fair share of social 
upheavals, and they have often resulted in unrest or worse.  Surely, automation in the South 
African manufacturing sector has the potential to ferment new social turbulence, and informed 
policymakers would be wise to consider the country’s transition into an automated age.  After 
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all, whether this transition will follow the peaceful path of the nation’s extolled leader Nelson 
Mandela, or take the incendiary route of the Luddites of the 19
th
 century, may in the end, be a 
matter of policy.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODS 
In order to suggest relevant policies, it was first necessary to develop a clearer picture of 
the South African manufacturing sector.  In Chapter Four, I have drawn from a variety of 
academic papers, consulting reports, industry documents, case studies, and government data in 
order to better understand the potential for automation across the activities with which the South 
African manufacturing sector is engaged.  I broke the sector into ten sub-sectors and gave 
rankings of high, medium, or low to each sub-sector’s priority level to the industry, and to each 
sub-sector’s potential to be affected by automation technologies.  These rankings are 
intentionally vague enough to avoid making specific and unscientific claims, but potent enough 
to inform policy recommendations and draw general conclusions about the sector at large. 
I determined the ranking for priority level by first considering the size of each sub-sector 
in terms of its percent contribution to the sector’s total labor force.  Because this thesis is 
concerned with the manufacturing sector with respect to its impact on its laborers, the number of 
laborers employed in each sector is of great concern.  An industry with a substantially greater 
number of laborers employed should thus be considered a higher priority industry.  Second, in 
determining priority rankings, I considered the total income produced by each sub-sector.  This 
metric is also necessary for analysis because it clearly has import to policy makers.  I have 
assigned priority rankings to be relative between sub-sectors; they do not adhere to absolute 
numerical thresholds. 
The rankings for automation potential were determined by a holistic analysis of the size 
of each sub-sector, industry trends, salaries within each sub-sector, and existing technology.  The 
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process of arriving at these rankings was less straightforward and required a level of subjectivity 
which renders these rankings useful insofar as they are used to rank the automation potential of 
sub-sectors relative to one another, but not against other industries or with respect to any 
absolute determination of automation potential.  Further, the timeline is not specified, nor should 
it be.  These rankings attempt to characterize the potential for processes within sub-sectors to be 
automated. 
This analysis primarily leveraged case studies and academic papers in order to assess 
automation potential.  The primary factor I considered and a necessary condition upon which all 
other factors are contingent is the technological feasibility of automating processes in each sub-
sector.  For any given sub-sector to have any level of automation potential, it must be possible to 
automate at least some aspects of production.  By seeking examples from case studies and 
academic studies, I determined whether or not technologies relevant to each sub-sector are 
currently available that have the capability of replacing or displacing human labor.  I also 
considered industry trends within each sub-sector; because competitive forces encourage the 
growth of new labor-saving technologies in some industries more than in others, this factor was 
necessary to consider.  I also analyzed the size of each sub-sector in terms of total labor force 
and total income; I considered the size of the sub-sector and thus the access to capital and 
specialization a possible influence on the potential to automate processes.  In addition, I 
considered the salaries within each sub-sector, as low wages are one factor that inhibits both 
adoption and research of some automated production technologies. 
Certainly, the high, medium, and low rankings are subject to political, economic, social, 
and technological vicissitudes not addressed in this thesis.  The purpose of these rankings is to 
achieve a level of accuracy adequate enough to draw conclusions about the manufacturing sector 
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in South Africa, only to the extent that the level of accuracy will facilitate drawing those 
conclusions.  To use a fictitious example, if sub-sector A demonstrates, according to the criteria 
discussed above, a markedly high automation potential, and sub-sector B is markedly low, and 
these two sub-sector account for the majority of the labor force, it follows that policy suggestions 
would reflect this difference and would be tailored to the different properties of the two sub-
sectors.  A different scenario might be such that sub-sectors A and B account for the stark 
majority of the labor force and both have a ranking of high automation potential, and thus a 
single policy could address both sub-sectors. 
It should be emphasized that this thesis will recognize only a general assessment, and that 
these trends are subject to fluctuations as technology changes.  It should also be noted that this 
classification is concerned with a broad potential for automation, and that whether this potential 
is actualized is dependent on a host economic, political, and social factors.  This thesis does not 
intend to make projections, or provide a timeline to which labor market changes will adhere. 
In Chapter Five, I compiled data on the socio-demographic composition of the South 
African labor force, and specifically labor in the manufacturing sector.  This data comes 
primarily from Statistics South Africa’s Quarterly Labor Force Survey (QLFS).  I then analyzed 
this data, surmising the implications of the literature review, particularly that some skill levels 
have a higher susceptibility to job displacement due to automation than others.  This analysis 
allowed for the determination of demographics most vulnerable to automation, thus informing 
the policy suggestions of Chapter Six. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
Sector Breakdown 
 In order to explore the future of labor in the manufacturing sector and recommend 
policies well-positioned to calibrate for the potential changes in the labor market, it will be 
necessary to break down the manufacturing sector by sub-sector.  This chapter will separate the 
manufacturing sector into ten, separate sub-sectors. 
 Figure one displays the ten areas within the South African manufacturing sector that this 
thesis will consider its sub-sectors.  This breakdown is consistent with Statistics South Africa’s 
manufacturing divisions (Statistics South Africa e, 2017).  Figure one also displays the number 
of employees working in each sub-sector in 2014. 
Figure One: South African Manufacturing Sector Sub-Sectors and Total Employment 
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Data compiled from Statistics South Africa i, 2016 
Figure two below also displays each of the ten sub-sectors within the manufacturing 
sector.  In addition, it displays the percent of labor in the manufacturing sector that each sub-
sector represents (in red), and the percent of total manufacturing income that each sub-sector 
represents (in blue).  This graph should put into perspective the need for labor in relation to the 
income from each sub-sector. 
Figure Two: Sub-Sectors by Percent Share of Labor and Total Income 
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Data compiled from Statistics South Africa i, 2016 
Figure three below displays the average yearly employee salary in each sub-sector.  This 
will be an important consideration when determining the potential for automation within each 
sub-sector.  An industry such as textiles, clothing, leather, and footwear, for example, has a 
relatively low average yearly salary.  The low average salary in this sub-sector is one factor 
likely to make human labor more competitive with automation. 
Figure Three: Average Salaries in Each Sub-Sector 
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Data compiled from Statistics South Africa i, 2016 
Although the objective of this thesis is not to predict job losses, some sub-sectors within 
the manufacturing sector are more susceptible to job displacement due to automation than others.  
For this reason, the capacity to automate production within each sub-sector will be explored.  
This thesis will draw upon case studies, academic inquiries, consulting reports, and industry 
documents to assess the general automation capacity of each manufacturing sub-sector in which 
South Africa is engaged.  In this chapter, I will classify each sub-sector’s automation potential as 
high, medium, or low.  I will also classify each sub-sector’s priority level, based on the size and 
income of the sub-sector.   
This chapter will also reference Frey and Osbourne’s (2017) widely-cited study on the 
susceptibility of labor to automation and “computerization.”  Frey and Osbourne developed what 
they consider a novel methodology to determine the probability of job displacement in 702 
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specific job fields.  The study analyzes each occupation by the activities with which employees 
are engaged, and ranks the probability of each occupation being automated from zero (not 
computerizable) to one (computerizable).  Most of the sub-sectors have at least one class of 
occupation that Frey and Osbourne have analyzed, and will be included to assist in the 
approximation of potential for automation in South Africa. 
Furniture and Other Manufacturing 
 The first South African sub-sector this thesis will explore is “furniture and other 
manufacturing.”  In 2014, the sub-sector employed 64,000 individuals, which comprised 5.3 
percent of the total manufacturing labor force.  This sub-sector accounted for 2.7 percent of the 
total income from the manufacturing sector, with an average salary of 114,240 Rand per year, the 
second-lowest average salary of the manufacturing sector sub-sectors (Statistics South Africa i, 
2016).  Because of the relatively low percentage of total labor and income in the sector, it will be 
considered a medium priority industry.  Examining a number of studies and industry sources in 
coordination with industry statistics will help to estimate the automation potential of furniture 
and other manufacturing. 
 As early as 1986, Sander, in the paper “New Automation Trends in the Furniture 
Industry,” explicated the trends with which this thesis is now concerned.  Sander showed that 
automation can improve various assembly processes in the furniture industry both yielding 
higher productivity and resulting in fewer errors.  Moreover, in a more recent and specific study, 
Barbosa et al. (2015) examined the process chains executed by completely automated 
manufacturing cells which produced airplane furniture, such as seating.  From the assembly of 
physical components, to the application of resin, to the curing of the product in an oven, the 
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process continued exclusively under the control of automated machinery.  The study cited the 
following as “tangible gains” from automating processes as opposed to production using manual 
labor: 
 Increase of productivity (reduction of manpower): gain of roughly $500 K per year; 
  Reduction of roughly 30% in wastes related to consumable materials; 
  Elimination of costs with non-conformity related with defects detected in final 
assemblies: gain of roughly $ 330 K per year; 
 Reduction with training costs and turnover of the workmanship; 
 Flexibility to meet the demands of production's volume; 
 Payback of investment in a short period of time. 
Although this study does not represent the potential for all types of furniture, nor are the 
advantages from automating processes in this particular case generalizable, it does provide a 
sense of the high-end potential for the automation of furniture; total automation appears 
physically feasible with existing technology. 
 In another paper, Hunter (2008) observed the reengineering of a furniture manufacturing 
cell at the Franklin Corporation, a Mississippi-based furniture company that builds reclining 
chairs and upholstered furniture.  The Franklin Corporation reengineered its cells to emulate the 
Toyota Production System (TPS).  The TPS is a manufacturing strategy that streamlines 
processes, minimizes human labor, automates certain processes, and reduces the risk of error 
(Hunter, 2008).  Hunter observed that, although the strategy was not developed for furniture, its 
adoption yielded an 11.2 percent increase in productivity.  Further, the manufacturing cell 
preceding reengineering required 11 workers, while only seven workers were required for the 
TPS cell. 
 Yet another case study by Elamvazuthi et al. (2009) examined the manufacturing of 
leather furniture, which requires a process called nesting.  Nesting typically requires manual 
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laborers to fit irregular-shaped pieces of material onto a surface without the pieces overlapping, 
and without trimming the pieces.  The process of nesting is integral to many furniture 
manufacturers.  The case study found that manual labor had relatively low productivity and high 
material loss.  The automated alternative, however, which was comprised of two, computer-
operated cutting stations, yielded higher productivity with substantially less loss of material. 
 The above studies indicate a high potential for automation in the furniture industry at 
large.  This is consistent with Frey and Osbourne’s (2017) analysis of furniture finishers, an 
occupation they gave a 0.87 probability ranking for computerization.  To put this into context, 
Frey and Osbourne assign the following probabilities of computerization for each respective 
occupation: 0.0031 for mental health and substance abuse social workers, 0.0064 for speech 
language pathologists, 0.011 for mechanical engineers, and 0.013 for sales managers.  
Furthermore, the 5.3 percent of South African manufacturing sector labor that comes from this 
sub-sector is almost twice as high as the 2.7 percent of the sub-sector’s contribution to the 
sector’s total income.  This suggests that the work is labor-intensive, relative to the other sub-
sectors. 
Transport Equipment 
 The second sub-sector is transport equipment.  In 2014, the sub-sector employed 105,000 
individuals, composing 8.9 percent of the entire manufacturing sector’s labor, and 15 percent of 
its income.  The average salary was 231,607 Rand per year, the third highest of the sub-sectors 
(Statistics South Africa i, 2016).  Because of transport equipment manufacturing’s significant 
percentage of the sector’s labor force and income, it will be considered a high-priority sub-
sector. 
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Global industrial robotics usage is highly concentrated in three manufacturing sub-
sectors: vehicles and transport equipment, electronics and electrical equipment, and machinery 
(Change & Huynh, 2016; Badishkanian, 2016).  This is also evident in from figure four below, 
which comes from UNCTAD’s 2016 policy brief, “Robots and Industrialization in Developing 
Countries.”  It is clear that not only is the use of industrial robots in the automotive industry high 
relative to other industries, but that in most industries represented, industrial robot supply is on 
the rise. 
Figure Four: Annual Industrial Robot Supply by Industry (Thousands of Units) 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2016 
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The case study expounded in the literature review comparing Volkswagen automobile 
assembly lines in Germany and South Africa made a clear case for automation in this South 
African industry as well.  It concluded that the South African assembly line’s optimal automation 
levels had not yet been reached.  And furthermore, in South Africa, the average yearly salary in 
this sub-sector is relatively high, creating an incentive to reduce labor costs.  These are all 
strongly suggestive of a high potential for automation in South African transport equipment 
manufacturing.  Frey and Osbourne did not analyze any relevant job category. 
Telecommunications, Medical and Optical Equipment, and Watches and Clocks 
The next sub-sector is “telecommunications, medical and optical equipment and watches 
and clocks” manufacturing.  This seemingly gerrymandered combination of goods is loosely 
consistent with the United Nations’ manufacturing sub-sector category, “medical, precision and 
optical instruments, watches and clocks” (United Nations Statistics Division, 2017).  The 
miscellaneous nature of these goods, however, render their production’s automation potential 
somewhat of a quagmire.  For this reason, this thesis will look to the industry statistics in South 
Africa for clarity. 
First, with only 13,000 employees and comprising 1.1 percent of the manufacturing 
sector labor force, this sub-sector is notably small.  Further, it only accounts for 0.7 percent of 
the entire sector’s income.  The average yearly salary is 221,362 Rand, the fourth largest of the 
sub-sectors (Statistics South Africa i, 2016).  The diversity of goods within telecommunications, 
medical and optical equipment, and watches and clocks manufacturing along with its dismal size 
and low employment figures should render its potential for automation low.  Firms benefit most 
from automation in manufacturing at scale, and the lack of prominence of this sub-sector suggest 
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that there is less incentive to automate productions.  Further, because it only employs 13,000 
workers, the weight of this group’s influence on policy is low relative to more populated sub-
sectors.  For the purposes of this thesis, the potential for automation in telecommunications, 
medical and optical equipment, and watches and clocks manufacturing will be considered low, as 
will its priority.  Frey an Osbourne did not analyze any relevant job category. 
Electrical Machinery 
The fourth sub-sector is electrical machinery.  In 2014, electrical machinery 
manufacturing employed 48,000 individuals, accounting for 4 percent of manufacturing labor 
and 3.1 percent of the sector’s total income.  The average yearly salary was 246,760 Rand 
(Statistics South Africa i, 2016).  This sub-sector will be considered low priority because of its 
relatively small percentage of the sector’s total employment and income. 
As stated earlier, electronics and machinery are two of the three manufacturing areas with 
the highest concentration of industrial robotics (Change & Huynh, 2016; Badishkanian, 2016; 
UNCTAD, 2017).  This sub-sector overlaps with both of them and has a high average yearly 
salary, suggesting that there is a high automation potential.  To buttress this classification, this 
section will expound two case studies that assess the effect of automation and technological 
change in electronics machinery production. 
Vitkova and Hajek (2016) developed a case study investigating the optimization of costs 
in the production of small electronic machinery.  First, they established the costs of the 
components involved in the production of small electronic machinery.  They then explored the 
technological improvements to the equipment’s manufacturing life cycle.  Among these 
improvements were automation of production and automation of testing, but they also included 
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additional non-automated hardware.  Based on Vitkova and Hajek’s calculations, the cost 
reductions after upgrading production were approximated as the following: 
• Material – 3.42 percent reduction 
• Personnel cost – 0.50 percent reduction 
• Energy cost – 0.45 percent reduction 
• Other cost – 2.45 percent reduction 
 
This case study illustrates that there are considerable cost-reduction incentives to automating 
aspects of production in the electrical machinery sub-sector. 
 The second case study (Suzuki, 1993) investigates research and development spillovers 
and their effect on electrical machinery manufacturing in Japan.  Although Japan’s economy and 
social structure is starkly different than South Africa’s, there are two key takeaways.  First, the 
study found that research and development has substantial spillovers even to competing firms.  
Second, the study found that these spillovers have a labor-substituting effect, suggesting that 
technological advances in this manufacturing sub-sector may displace labor.  This sub-sector 
appears to have a high potential for automation, which is consistent with Frey and Osbourne’s 
(2017) findings of a 0.95 percent probability of computerization for electrical and electronic 
equipment assemblers.  
Metals, Metal Products, Machinery, and Equipment 
The fifth sub-sector is metals, metal products, machinery, and equipment.  In 2014, it 
employed 250,000 individuals, accounting for 21 percent of labor in the manufacturing sector 
and 16.6 percent of the sector’s total income.  The average salary was 209,405 Rand per year 
(Statistics South Africa i, 2016).  From the start, the sub-sector’s high percentage of employment 
and income in the sector makes it a high priority.  In order to determine the potential for 
automation in this sub-sector, an industry document and a case study will be expounded. 
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An Emerson Industrial Automation (2015) report provides an in-depth overview of metal, 
metal product, and machinery manufacturing and explicates the applications and benefits of 
automating processes.  The report lists the following as processes which are optimized when 
automated: 
 Degreasing lines 
 Coating lines 
 Bonding lines 
 Slitters and cutting lines 
 Cut-to-length machines 
 Aluminum cold rolling mills 
 Copper cold rolling mills 
 Metal presses 
 Wiredraw lines 
Further, the report lists the following benefits to automating the above processes: 
 Manufacturing consistently high quality finished metals 
 Providing precision and repeatability in terms of performance, control and long term 
reliability from machinery 
 Maximizing productivity and throughput 
 Saving energy 
 Reducing operation costs 
 Providing the support and technology to exactly meet your production requirements 
 Enhancing safety and providing environmentally sound solutions 
The report continues to explain the far-reaching capacity of automation within this industry, 
making a clear case that many of the processes in this area of manufacturing can be automated, 
and that there are incentives for doing so. 
 A case study by ABB Robotics (2010) investigated an Ontario-based manufacturing firm, 
Azimuth Three Enterprises, and its recent investment in industrial robot integration into its metal 
fabrication production facilities.  Notably, one of the driving factors behind this investment was 
reportedly the lack of skilled laborers.  The study found that the use of robotics addressed this 
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issue for the firm and resulted in increased speed and accuracy and a reduction in cost and 
maintenance.  Because of the capacity to automate processes in this sub-sector and the strong 
apparent incentives to do so, metals, metal products, machinery, and equipment manufacturing 
will be considered to have a high automation potential.  This is consistent with the findings of 
Frey and Osbourne (2017), who gave a 0.82 probability of computerization to sheet metal 
workers, and a 0.88 probability to metal-refining furnace operators and tenders. 
Glass and Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
 The sixth sub-sector is glass and non-metallic mineral products.  In 2014, it employed 
60,000 individuals, constituting five percent of total manufacturing labor and three percent of 
total manufacturing income.  The average salary was the third lowest of the sub-sectors, at 
145,822 Rand per year (Statistics South Africa i, 2016).  Because of the small size of the sub-
sector, it will be considered a low-priority industry.  To estimate the automation potential of this 
sub-sector, this section will reference a comprehensive report involved with the industry. 
 In 2004, Siemens, a large, industrial manufacturing company, published an analysis of 
industry trends in glass manufacturing along with a series of case studies analyzing various firms 
(Siemens, 2004).  The report made a compelling case for very momentous trends towards robotic 
automation in industrial automation and the integration of computer-based management in 
almost all aspects of production.  The analysis was supported by a number of case studies, 
including the two following. 
 The first case study, “Transparency and Reliability (Siemens, 2004), examined the recent 
upgraded float glass production line of Europe’s largest glass manufacturer, Saint-Gobain.  It 
integrated both hardware and software into the existing line to bring to fruition the industry’s 
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“Totally Integrated Automation” concept.  The study notes enhanced ability to measure pressure, 
flow, and temperature and overall economic benefits.  Further, one computer control system 
controls the production lines in the entire plant, keeping real-time records of measurements in 
order to reduce waste. 
 The second case study, “Perfect Premiere” (Siemens, 2004), examined the automation of 
a hydraulic press in a plant that produces TV pressed glass.  The hydraulic press is one of the 
most integral machines in the production of TV pressed glass, which is produced at the plant 24 
hours a day.  The automation system integrated a series of computer-controlled software systems 
which, after their integration, was reported to have met the complete satisfaction of the firm. 
 From these two cases studies, it is evident that automating critical aspects of the glass 
production process is possible.  Frey and Osbourne’s (2017) findings indicate a high level of 
automation potential in this industry as well, giving a 0.88 probability of computerization to 
extruding and forming machine setters, operators, and tenders of synthetic and glass fibers.  The 
average yearly salary of employees in this industry in South Africa, however, is relatively low.  
Further, the industry accounts for only a dismal percentage of the sector’s labor and total income.  
For these reasons, in the South African context the automation potential will be considered 
medium. 
Coke, Petroleum, Chemical Products, Rubber, and Plastic Products 
 The seventh sub-sector is coke
6
, petroleum, chemical products, rubber, and plastic 
products.  In 2014, it employed 175,000 individuals, making up 14.7 percent of manufacturing 
labor and 34.1 percent of its income.  The average employee salary was 265,871 Rand (Statistics 
                                                          
6
 Coke is a solid, coal-based fuel.  This does not reference the beverage coke. 
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South Africa i, 2016).  This industry provides the highest percentage of total income, the third-
highest percentage of labor, and the highest average employee salary.  It is clearly a high priority 
industry within the South Africa manufacturing sector.  Only a small percentage of activities 
within this sub-sector were from rubber and plastic production and most were engaged in fuel 
production (Statistics South Africa e, 2017).  This section will discuss two case studies in order 
to approximate the automation potential of this sub-sector. 
 The first case study comes from the industry itself and is titled, “Major Petroleum 
Refinery Converts to New Digital Automation System” (Maverick Technologies, 2008).  The 
refinery in this study completely revamped its production facilities, automating and upgrading 
flow, temperature, and pressure measurements, eliminating “midnight workarounds,” and 
allowing for more computer-based control of combustion.  Although it is unclear to what extent 
the changes in this case did or did not displace labor, or perhaps increased the demand for labor, 
this industry example illustrates the capacity to automate and digitize aspects of petroleum 
production. 
 The second study comes from the energy and fuel technology journal, Koks i Khimiya 
and is titled “Trends in the Automation of Coke Production” (Rudyka et al., 2009).  The coke 
manufacturing process requires closely-monitored furnace temperatures.  The automation 
process examined in this study streamlined system-wide operations and monitored temperatures 
and other conditions important to the manufacturing process.  The study explicitly stated that the 
automation of production “reduces the workload of the staff.”  This does not necessarily imply 
job displacement, but does raise questions about the demand for existing numbers of staff.  
Further, the study stated that, “the presence of an operator at a local operator point is increasingly 
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rare,” insinuating a trend towards fewer of such staff.  The conclusion of the study was that 
human error is reduced and that “completely automatic control” can be achieved. 
Extrapolating from these two case studies, in concert with the high percentage of income 
and labor from this sub-sector, and that its average employee yearly salary is the highest of all 
sub-sectors in manufacturing, this industry will be considered to have a high potential for 
automation.  This is consistent with the findings of Frey and Osbourne (2017), who assigned 
chemical plant and systems operators a 0.85 probability of computerization, and petroleum pump 
system, refinery operators, and gaugers a 0.71 probability. 
Wood and Wood Products, Paper, Publishing, and Printing 
 The eighth sub-sector is wood and wood products, paper, publishing, and printing.  In 
2014, this sub-sector employed 132,000 individuals, accounting for 11.1 percent of labor in 
manufacturing and 5.5 percent of total manufacturing income.  The average employee salary was 
156,616 Rand per year (Statistics South Africa i, 2016).  Because this industry comprises 11.1 
percent of the manufacturing labor force, it will be considered a high priority sub-sector.  To get 
a sense of the potential for automation, this section will explore one case study and one industry 
analysis. 
 In the paper, “Opportunities for robotic automation in wood product industries: The 
supplier and system integrators´ perspective,” Landscheidt et al. (2017) explored the demand for 
automation solutions in the wood product production industry from the side of the suppliers.  
They found that there was substantial demand among current and potential customers, but often 
little knowledge of the available technologies.  Some of the main issues hindering firms from 
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automating aspects of production, the case study reasons, are a result of managerial and 
workforce fears, incompetence, or lack of understanding. 
 In the seminal book, Springer Handbook of Automation, Vogel-Heuser (2009) analyzes 
the technical capacity of automation in the wood and paper industry in the chapter “Automation 
in the Wood and Paper Industry.”  The chapter details the complex machinery and computing 
systems pervasive throughout existing wood and paper production automation, and concludes 
with a discussion of trends and future developments.  What is clear from this 2009 chapter is that 
the wood and paper industry still has major advances to come throughout the entire engineering 
life cycle. 
Both the case study on the wood product industry and Vogel-Heuser’s analysis suggest 
future potential for automation.  The case study finds that it is not due to a lack of relevance or 
benefits that hinder adoption of automation technologies, but ignorance of benefits, suggesting 
areas where existing technologies have potential to be integrated.  The industry analysis portends 
future developments in the automation of manufacturing that competitive firms may integrate.  
Further, because in South Africa this sub-sector comprises a significant percentage of the 
manufacturing sector’s labor force, this sub-sector will be considered to have a high automation 
potential.  This is consistent with Frey and Osbourne’s (2017) findings, with the following 
probabilities of computerization: 0.91 for wood patternmakers, 0.97 for woodworking machine 
setters, operators, and tenders (excluding sawing), and 0.86 for wood sawing machine setters, 
operators, and tenders. 
Textiles, Clothing, Leather, and Footwear 
 
 
40 
 
 Sub-sector number nine is textiles, clothing, leather, and footwear, and in 2014, it 
employed 113,000 individuals.  This constitutes 9.5 percent of the country’s manufacturing labor 
force, and 2.2 percent of the sector’s total income.  The average salary was 69,443 Rand per year 
(Statistics South Africa i, 2016).  This is the lowest average yearly salary of the sub-sectors as 
they are defined.  Because nearly ten percent of the manufacturing labor force is employed in 
this industry but only accounts for a small fraction of total income, it will be considered a 
medium priority industry.  This section will explicate two academic papers and one United 
Nations International Labor Organization (ILO) paper to provide insights into the automation 
potential in textiles, clothing, leather, and footwear. 
 In the first paper, the authors Parker et al. (1983) tested a small robotic arm specifically 
designed to pick up a fabric square from a stack, an iterative physical process common in the 
garment manufacturing industry.  The paper makes numerous references to automated processes 
in garment manufacturing replacing human labor, but the technologies in this domain are still 
limited.  The paper notes that no robotic component to date can compete with the human finger 
when it comes to various aspects of sewing and cutting fabrics.  The robotic arm tested was 
successful in its particular task 95 percent of the time, which may be a distinguished feat of 
engineering, but not be reliable enough for factory-wide integration. 
 The second investigation (Torgerson & Paul, 1988) runs an experiment with machine-
vision for robotic apparel manufacturing.  The paper first explains how international competition 
in the textile industry drives innovation in robotic manufacturing, but that there are still 
technological gaps in the robotic handling of fabrics as opposed to solid materials.  The authors 
conducted experiments with a concept called path analysis, a process in which robotic systems to 
use visual inputs on fabric size and shape to inform robotic motion.  They found great utility in 
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the vision-guided robotics systems, which were used in the experiment to cut fabrics, but 
emphasized the need for research on technologies that can join pieces of fabric robotically and 
autonomously. 
The preceding papers were published in 1983 and 1988, respectively.  The technology 
and its lapses that papers discuss have since been subject to significant changes.  A more recent 
paper from the ILO on the potential for job displacement due to automation among ASEAN 
countries
7
 discusses garment manufacturing in the Asian context, providing another point on the 
trajectory of industry trends through time, and thus delivering insights into the potential for 
automation in the industry.  The paper (Chang & Huynh, 2016) consistently referred to the 
industry as being at high risk of automation, stating that the “large share” of garment workers is 
at risk.  The paper also cited US textile manufacturers that were successful in “developing robots 
and materials-handling systems that can stitch pieces of fabric together, pick them up and move 
them to another machine.”  This clearly demonstrates important technological advances since the 
Torgerson and Paul’s 1988 paper. 
 From these three papers, it appears that the textile, clothing, leather, and footwear sub-
sectors display demonstrable potential for automation.  This is also reflected in Frey and 
Osbourne’s (2017) findings, with a 0.73 probability for computerization of textile knitting and 
weaving machine setters, operators, and tenders, and a 0.81 probability for pressers of textiles, 
garments, and related materials.  The factor that differentiates this sub-sector from others in 
South Africa, however, is the notably low salaries of workers employed in it.  Although South 
African manufacturing salaries are on the rise (Statistics South Africa i, 2016), the relatively 
lower salaries in this sub-sector render it at a medium level of automation potential. 
                                                          
7
 Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Brunei 
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Food Products and Beverages 
 The final sub-sector is food products and beverages.  In 2014, it employed 230,000 
individuals, comprising 19.3 percent of the manufacturing sector’s total labor force and 17.1 
percent of its income.  The average yearly employee salary was 155,094 (Statistics South Africa 
i, 2016).  Because 19.3 percent of the manufacturing labor force work in this industry, it will be 
considered high priority.  In order to estimate automation potential, this section will explore two 
papers on the topic. 
 The first paper comes from an Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
conference (Schleipen & Drath, 2009).  The paper examines a data format that facilitates the 
storage and exchange of engineering data, called Automation Markup Language 
(AutomationML).  The paper focuses on an assembly line in the food and beverage industry to 
explain a model for understanding AutomationML.  More specifically, the paper details the use 
of automation technologies on the portion of an assembly line that fills containers with infant 
formula.  Although the paper is primarily concerned with the technical details of 
AutomationML’s application on the assembly line, the investigation very clearly illustrates a 
complex, highly automated assembly line with little if any human labor involved directly with 
the product. 
 The second paper, “Trends in Food Packing and Manufacturing Systems Technology” 
(Mahalik & Nambiar, 2010), studies manufacturing in the industry more holistically.  It notes 
challenges specific to the industry, especially regarding health regulations.  Moreover, the short 
shelf life of food products, unlike other industries, forces upon manufacturers the need for 
speedy manufacturing processes.  Concerning human employment, the paper takes a clear 
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position that automation in the industry reduces the need for human employment and that 
continued adoption of automation in production lines is necessarily an industry trend. 
Both of these examples point to a high level of existing technology, and the second of 
them points to continued expansion of production automation in this industry.  Further, this sub-
sector in South Africa boasts a high percentage of both manufacturing labor and total income; 
maintaining a competitive edge will therefore be essential.  For these reasons, this thesis will 
consider the automation potential of this food products and beverages manufacturing to be high.  
This is consistent with Frey and Osbourne’s findings, who give machine operators of food and 
tobacco roasting, baking, and drying a 0.91 probability for computerization. 
Re-Shoring of the Manufacturing Sector 
Not only does the high potential for automation clearly affect South African 
manufacturing firms, it affects firms in other countries as well.  This leads to a phenomenon 
called re-shoring: the return of manufacturing production to the developed countries that 
previously outsourced production.  The appeal of low wages that once gave developing countries 
a competitive advantage in labor-intensive industry may be fading. 
The re-shoring phenomenon is closely linked with automation in the manufacturing 
sector.  One of the incentives driving the re-shoring of manufacturing production comes from the 
deluge of benefits associated with automating production.  In developed countries, where 
physical infrastructure is generally more developed, the political climate is comparatively more 
stable, capital is easier to acquire, and the availability of skilled labor is greater, the comparative 
advantage for automation is clear. 
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 The re-shoring of production to developed countries implicitly results in job displacement 
in the countries where goods were previously produced.  This means that when firms in 
developed countries automate processes at home and cease production activities in countries 
where labor is cheap, the laborers in developing countries lose their jobs.  Firms in developed 
countries, however, can only re-shore the activities that have already been offshored.  In the case 
of the South African manufacturing sector, foreign-owned production has the potential to be re-
shored when automating processes elsewhere become more productive.  South African-owned 
firms, however, have less capacity to offshore production to developed countries than the 
developed countries themselves.  For example, a German manufacturing firm would find it easier 
to return production from South Africa to Germany than would a South African firm relocating 
to Germany for the first time.  One survey of 600 South African manufacturing firms (Roberts, 
2006) illustrates the difficulty of South Africa outsourcing production to other countries.  Only 
three of the 600 firms preferred to outsource production. 
Because this phenomenon is pertinent to the future of labor in South Africa, it is 
necessary to draw a distinction between South African labor in South African-owned and 
foreign-owned manufacturing firms.  Essentially, it is crucial to investigate whether or not 
manufacturing jobs leaving South Africa for other countries may play a role in the future of 
South Africa’s manufacturing labor.  To know this, it is important to know if that labor is 
primarily employed by South African or foreign-owned firms. 
 Determining the exact number of laborers that work for South African-owned 
manufacturing firms and those who work for foreign-owned manufacturing firms is problematic.  
The existing data on offshoring is poor, and the companies and governments that do collect this 
data have little incentive to publish it (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2010; Kirkegaard, 2007; Sako, 
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2005).  The analyses that have been performed have differed substantially in their 
methodologies, resulting in inconsistent findings (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2010). 
Statistics South Africa is the national statistical service of South Africa and publishes the 
country’s production, labor, and census statistics.  It does not, however, publish any data on the 
number of domestic employees working for foreign-owned firms.  One possible source of this 
information could be the South African Corporate Income Tax, but its database does not include 
or publish data on the number of employees in each firm it taxes (Kreuser & Newman, 2016).  
The Oxford Handbook of Offshoring and Global Employment (2013) suggests capturing this 
data by analyzing foreign direct investment (FDI) inward flows in coordination with data from 
trade-in-services.  Chapter 24 of this handbook, “Industrial Strategy, Offshoring, and 
Employment Promotion in South Africa,” was unable to arrive at any set of statistics using this 
methodology, referring to the data as “neither consistent nor complete” and stating, 
The representation of trends often relies on nonscientific measures offered by 
business associations, sector-based consulting firms, or the press.  This makes 
scrutiny of data near impossible.  Moreover, reports may mix definitions, so it is 
not always clear what is included or excluded in any representation (Altman, 
2013). 
For these reasons, the statistics on the number of laborers in South African versus 
foreign-owned firms may not be available, but the lack of these figures does not preclude an 
analysis of the marketability of South Africa as a destination for offshoring manufacturing 
production.  
 Further, in 2016, Deloitte published its “Global Manufacturing Competitiveness Index,” 
which is based on a global survey of over 550 CEOs and senior manufacturing executives.  The 
Index ranks the manufacturing global competitiveness of 38 countries from one (most 
competitive) to 38 (least competitive).  Of the 38 countries ranked, South Africa was ranked 
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number 24 (Deloitte, 2016), far from even the top ten optimal locations to offshore productions 
to, according to this analysis.  One study (Roberts, 2006), found that of labor-intensive 
manufacturing small and medium size enterprises (SME) in clothing and textiles, only three 
percent of ownership was foreign, and for fabricated metals and furniture production, SMEs had 
zero percent foreign ownership.  The apparent lack of foreign ownership in manufacturing SMEs 
buttresses the findings of Deloitte. 
Snapshot of Automation Potential in South African Manufacturing 
 Based on the above analysis, a clearer picture of the automation potential within South 
African manufacturing begins to emerge.  Five of the ten sub-sectors have both a high potential 
for automation, and a high priority level.  This accounts for 892,000 workers employed in the 
sector, or 75 percent of the total labor force, based on the Statistics South Africa figures from its 
2014 financial report (Statistics South Africa i, 2016).  Further, over 1,000,000 workers are 
employed in sub-sectors that have a high potential for automation, accounting for 84 percent of 
the entire manufacturing labor force (see table one). 
Table One: Automation Potential and Sub-Sector Priority Intersections 
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 Although the stark majority of laborers in the South African manufacturing sector work 
in sub-sectors that have a high potential for automation, there is no implication that all of the jobs 
within each sub-sector are equally susceptible to being automated.  For example, it is intuitive 
that a semi-skilled, assembly-line laborer working in transport equipment is more likely to be 
displaced than an occupational therapist.  But it is also intuitive that assembly-line laborers far 
outnumber occupational therapists in this industry.  In fact, Bhorat and Rooney (2017) found that 
“craft and trade workers” and “operators and assemblers” account for over 50 percent of the jobs 
in South African manufacturing.  What the above analysis illustrates is the high potential for 
automation in sub-sectors that account for most of the manufacturing workforce, and that all of 
the high priority industries have a high automation potential. 
 What is also evident is that South Africa is lagging behind the rest of the world in its 
adoption of automation technology (see figure six).  This implies a relatively low level of 
automation at present, and presages future investments in automation if South Africa is to remain 
competitive.  Although it is beyond this thesis to examine the entire panoply of forces that play a 
role in the adoption of automation technologies in manufacturing, it has been demonstrated that 
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there exists significant automation potential in the manufacturing sector in South Africa, and that 
South African firms have strong incentives to automate production. 
Figure Six: Estimated Year-End Operational Stock of Industrial Robots by Region 
(Thousands of Units) 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2016 
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 Re-shoring may present another challenge for South African manufacturing but it is 
unclear how many workers, if any, will be affected.  South Africa as a destination for large-scale 
future offshoring, however, does not seem likely.  The combination of rising wages and 
comparatively dismal investments in industrial robots render South Africa increasingly less 
attractive to foreign direct investments in manufacturing, a trend that has been captured by the 
Deloitte survey explicated earlier (Deloitte, 2013). 
 The preceding points do not bode well for the future of labor in the South African 
manufacturing sector.  Although specific figures or occupations cannot be deduced from the 
preceding analysis, the consistency of trends toward automation and away from human labor in 
the industries with which South Africa is engaged herald job displacement for many South 
African workers.  The next chapter will explore the socio-demographic characteristics of 
manufacturing laborers so that policies targeted toward them can most efficaciously advance 
their welfare. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS OF SOUTH AFRICAN MANUFACTURING LABORERS 
Gender in South African Manufacturing Labor 
 Any policy of import to the welfare of the South African laborers in the manufacturing 
sector should consider the sector’s demographic characteristics.  This chapter will thus explore 
the characteristics of the South Africa labor market, and where data is available, the socio-
demographic characteristics of laborers in the manufacturing sector specifically. 
 As discussed earlier, the unemployment rate in South Africa was 27.7 percent in 2017.  
Of the unemployed, 10.7 percent were previously employed in the manufacturing sector 
(Statistics South Africa b, 2017).  Table two, below, outlines the general landscape of the South 
African labor market
8
. 
Table Two: South African Labor Market Figures 
 
Data compiled from Statistics South Africa b, 2017 
 Statistics South Africa’s Quarterly Labor Force Survey (QLFS) for the second quarter of 
2017 also published employment statistics disaggregated by gender.  Figure seven displays the 
same figures as above, but distinguishes between men and women in the labor force. 
                                                          
8
 The figures in this chapter are primarily based on Statistics South Africa’s 2017 second Quarterly Labor Force 
Survey, whose numbers slightly differ from Statistics South Africa’s industry financials in 2014, expounded earlier. 
Total Working
Age Population
Total
Employed
Percent
Employed
Total
Unemployed
Percent
Unemployed
Total Not
Economically
Active
Labor Force
Participation
Rate
Total
Population
37,061,000 16,212,000 43.7 6,214,000 27.7 14,634,000 60.5
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Figure Seven: South African Labor Force Disaggregated by Gender 
 
Data compiled from Statistics South Africa b, 2017 
From these figures, it is clear that a notably higher percentage of males are employed than 
female.  The unemployment rates, however, are closer to parity.  When accounting for labor 
force participation rates, however, it becomes evident that the lower participation rates for 
females can account for the lower employment percentage. 
 The lack of female participation in the labor force does not necessarily entail a lack of 
will to participate.  The QLFS considers an unemployed person an individual capable of work 
that at some point in the preceding four weeks, from the time of the survey, actively sought 
work, but did not work during that time (Wilkinson, 2017).  It is perfectly conceivable that many 
women that the QLFS considers not participating in the labor force have either been searching 
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for work for more than four weeks or have stopped searching for work due to a lack of 
opportunities, but would be willing to work. 
 In the manufacturing industry, the labor force is dominated by males.  According to the 
2017 QLFS, the sector employs 820,623 males and 369,813 females.  Figure eight displays the 
employment within each sub-sector broken down by gender. 
Figure Eight: Manufacturing Sector Labor by Sub-Sector and by Gender 
 
Data compiled from Statistics South Africa i, 2016 
 Only in the textile industry do females outnumber males.  Despite this, however, the 
Department of Trade and Industry claims that 50 percent of senior management positions employ 
females (Department of Trade and Industry, 2017).  Surmising that laborers in low or semi-
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skilled positions are more susceptible to job displacement due to automation, females already 
working in the manufacturing sector may have, proportional to total employment, more 
protection than men.  Even if employment by skill level were assumed proportional to 
employment by gender, because more than twice as many males are employed in the 
manufacturing sector than women, if job displacement were to occur in this sector at scale, it 
would likely result in more unemployed males than females. 
Age in South African Manufacturing Labor 
 Also compiled from Statistics South Africa’s 2017 QLFS for the second quarter, the table 
and graph below displays South Africa’s employment statistics by age (see table three and figure 
nine). 
Table Three: South African Labor Force by Age 
 
Data compiled from Statistics South Africa b, 2017 
Figure Nine: South African Labor Force, Percent Employed, by Age 
Total Working
Age Population
Total
Employed
Percent
Employed
Total
Unemployed
Percent
Unemployed
Total Not
Economically
Active
Labor Force
Participation
Rate
15-24 10,315,000 1,226,000 11.9 1,552,000 55.9 7,537,000 26.9
25-34 9,780,000 4,907,000 50.2 2,399,000 32.8 2,473,000 74.7
35-44 7,943,000 5,040,000 63.5 1,450,000 22.3 1,452,000 81.7
45-54 5,467,000 3,420,000 62.6 623,000 15.4 1,424,000 74
55-64 3,712,000 1,506,000 40.6 153,000 9.2 2,053,000 44.7
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Data compiled from Statistics South Africa b, 2017 
From table three, the total working age population distribution clearly exhibits the properties of a 
pyramid-like structure.  This distribution, though, is not represented in the numbers of total 
employment, and continues to deviate in the distribution of percentages of employment.  The 25-
34 age range’s total employment figure swells at nearly 5,000,000 people, but so does its total 
number of unemployed.  As much as 38.2 percent of the working age population in this age 
range is unemployed, accounting for more than 2,000,000 people.  And although this age range 
accounts for 38.2 percent of the nation’s unemployed persons, it only makes up 26 percent of the 
working age population. 
 The 15-24 age range represents a disproportionate percentage of unemployed persons as 
well, comprising 25 percent of unemployed persons and 28 percent of the total working age 
population.  Although these two percentages do not differ significantly, this age range accounts 
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for over half of those not participating in the labor force at all.  This is ostensibly due to many 
individuals from this range being still in school.  These figures are consistent with Sachs and 
Kotlikoff (2012), discussed earlier, who found that lower levels of skill exist in younger 
demographics and thus are less attractive in the labor market. 
Education and Skill Level 
 As discussed earlier, the skills gap between low or semi-skilled and skilled labor is 
manifesting in employment trends.  While demand for low and semi-skilled labor decreases, the 
demand for skilled labor sees a corresponding increase.  This is true of the South African 
manufacturing sector as well.  Figure ten displays the trend away from semi-skilled and unskilled 
labor, where in a 44 year period some industries saw a drop of as much as 15 percent of 
employment of this skill demographic.  Figure eleven shows the similar trends in skilled labor, 
and figure twelve in highly skilled labor. 
Figure Ten: Trends in Semi-Skilled and Unskilled Labor in South African Manufacturing 
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Source: merSETA, 2010 
Figure Eleven: Trends in Skilled Labor in South African Manufacturing 
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Source: merSETA, 2010 
Figure Twelve: Trends in Highly Skilled Labor in South African Manufacturing 
 
 
58 
 
 
Source: merSETA, 2010 
Race in South African Manufacturing Labor 
 The last demographic characteristic to be unpacked is race.  Table four, below, displays 
the breakdown of employment by race.  Graph thirteen displays the breakdown of the total 
working age population by race, and figure fourteen illustrates the employment disparity 
between races. 
Table Four: South African Labor Force by Race
9
 
                                                          
9
 These are South Africa’s four primary official categories of race 
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Data compiled from Statistics South Africa b, 2017 
Figure Thirteen: South African Labor Force, Total Working Age Population, By Race 
 
Data compiled from Statistics South Africa b, 2017 
Figure Fourteen: South African Labor Force, Percent Employed, by Race 
Total Working
Age Population
Total
Employed
Percent
Employed
Total
Unemployed
Percent
Unemployed
Total Not
Economically
Active
Labor Force
Participation
Rate
Black/
African
29,798,000 12,025,000 40.4 5,479,000 31.3 12,294,000 58.7
Coloured 3,406,000 1,631,000 49.8 503,000 23.6 1,272,000 62.7
Indian/
Asian
992,000 526,000 52.9 80,000 13.3 388,000 61
White 3,028,000 1,918,000 63.5 115,000 5.7 987,000 67.3
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Data compiled from Statistics South Africa b, 2017 
What is lucidly clear from the above figures is that Black/African population experiences 
significantly higher levels of unemployment than the others listed.  This is both a factor of the 
substantial difference in the size of populations by race, and the higher percentage of 
unemployment among the Black/African population. 
Snapshot of South African Labor Force 
The South African labor market is primarily comprised of Black/African workers.  It is 
also dominated by males.  In the manufacturing sector, this is especially true, where more than 
twice as many males are employed than females.  Every sub-sector within this industry sees 
predominantly male employment, with the exception of the textiles, clothing, leather, and 
footwear sub-sector. 
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The labor market at large sees its highest rates of unemployment among younger 
demographics, namely, the age ranges of 15-24 and 25-34.  Unemployment among these 
populations corresponds with a lack of skills.  This, as well, is especially true in the 
manufacturing sector, where low and semi-skilled labor is in decline and high-skilled labor is 
rising.  Further, figure fifteen below displays labor in the manufacturing sector by province. 
Figure Fifteen: Percent of Manufacturing Employment by Province 
 
 In the context of potential job displacement due to automation in this sector, low and 
semi-skilled, young, black males appear most at risk.  This is because labor in this sector, 
assuming at least a loose representation of race in the South African labor force, is primarily 
comprised of Black/Africa peoples, and specifically males in this sector.  Moreover, 
unemployment exists in its highest percentages among young demographics, and in 
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manufacturing, is moving away from low and semi-skilled labor.  It is thus this population with 
which policies intending to embrace unemployment in manufacturing should be most urgently 
concerned. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Sector Security 
 As discussed, job displacement due to automation is not a new phenomenon, albeit its 
vicissitudes of degree and variety may be particularly unfavorable to future workers.  Boasting 
employment for nearly 11.2 percent of the total workforce (Statistics South Africa b, 2017), the 
manufacturing sector is critical to South Africa’s economy and social fabric.  Policy makers 
should take proactive measures to promote the sector’s competitiveness as it finds its footing in 
the twenty-first century, while also considering the welfare of those whose livelihoods are 
supported by their employment within it.  The first of three policy suggestion areas is concerned 
with securing the sector’s role in the future of global manufacturing. 
 In Deloitte’s report on enhancing manufacturing competitiveness in South Africa (2013), 
the importance of cooperation between public and private sectors is proffered as a crucial means 
to secure a competitive edge.  Two policies already included in the DTI’s IPAP stand out as 
contenders for frameworks of cooperation between the private and public sectors in South 
Africa.  They are the Protection of Investment Act of 2015, and the National Supplies 
Procurement Act of 1970. 
 The IPAP provides the following description of the 2015 Protection of Investment Act: to 
“provide for the protection of investors and their investments; achieve a balance of rights and 
obligations that apply to all investors; and provide for matters connected therewith” (Department 
of Trade and Industry, 2017).  This policy is further discussed in relation to bilateral investment 
treaties under review by the DTI.  In its review process, the DTI has terminated 15 out of the 22 
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first-generation treaties germane to the industry.  The “Interministerial Committee of 
Investment” is in the process of negotiation of? a new model bilateral investment treaty which 
will be aligned with the Protection of Investment Act of 2015, with a specific focus on 
intellectual property rights. 
 The interim nature of the implementation of this policy and its effect on bilateral trade 
agreements provides an opportunity for consideration of the future of the manufacturing sector 
and its increasingly important relationship with automation.  As shown earlier (see figure six), 
Africa as a continent has invested dolefully less in industrial robotics than the rest of the world.  
Germany alone, for example, had roughly an order a magnitude more industrial robots in stock in 
2013 than the entire continent of Africa.  The Interministerial Committee of Investment should 
include provisions in the model bilateral investment treaty, off of which future bilateral 
investment treaties will ostensibly be based, to promote investments in industrial robots, perhaps 
by reducing tariffs on imports or establishing reliable apparatuses of dispute resolution for 
potential investors. 
 Second, and related to the Protection of Investment Act, is the National Supplies 
Procurement Act of 1970.  The IPAP provides the following description of the policy: to 
“empower the responsible Minister to manufacture, produce, acquire, hire or import goods; 
acquire, hire or supply services; exercise control over goods and services, and the manufacture, 
production, processing and treating of goods; and provide for the establishment and 
administration of a national supplies procurement fund” (Department of Trade and Industry, 
2017).  Although this Act was put forth in 1970, it is still part of the DTI’s IPAP, and provides a 
framework for the acquisition of automation technologies which can keep South Africa 
competitive.  Perhaps the negotiations of the Interministerial Committee of Investment should 
 
 
65 
 
consider allocating specific powers to the relevant Ministers mentioned in the National Supplies 
Procurement Act, which would facilitate import of industrial robots and technologies necessary 
to automate future productions and keep up with the technological changes of the sector. 
 Lastly and more broadly, to reiterate the advice of UNCTAD in “Robots and 
Industrialization in Developing Countries” (2016), intra and inter-sectoral linkages help the 
sector take advantage of existing strengths and intrinsic comparative advantage.  For example, 
South Africa is well known for its robust mining industry and abundance of natural mineral 
wealth.  Many manufacturing processes utilize or refine the same minerals excavated in the 
mining sector.  There therefore exists an opportunity to leverage policy in order to encourage 
linkages between these two sectors.  Policies that advantage South African manufacturing firms’ 
access to domestically-mined mineral goods may be in order.  It is, however, critical to enact 
policies that refrain from disadvantaging the mining industry, such as an export tariff on mineral 
goods.  One alternative may be tax breaks for mining firms that sell a certain percentage of their 
mineral wealth domestically, indirectly providing incentives that reduce input costs to South 
African manufacturing firms and crafting a comparative advantage. 
Skill Upgrading 
 The second set of policy recommendations pertain to upgrading skills of some 
manufacturing workers to both meet the rising demand for skilled labor in the industry and 
provide job security to workers.  This is especially germane to younger populations and the 
existing skills development and educational institutions, about which the OECD has stated in a 
policy brief, “with low quality, low status and low labour market relevance, the system is ill-
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prepared to address the needs of the country’s burgeoning youth population” (South Africa 
Policy Brief, 2015).   
 In 2015, Ireland’s official agency for international development, Irish Aid, published a 
comprehensive study on the youth labor market in South Africa’s manufacturing sector (Irish 
Aid, 2015).  The study interviewed representatives of government institutions, employers, youth 
currently undergoing related training, and other stakeholders.  Of the 18 employers interviewed, 
there was a clear consensus that training youth employees internally was preferred to outsourcing 
to government training programs.  It was also clear that employers preferred to hire from within 
rather than from pools of recent graduates from vocational and technical colleges, noting a lack 
of confidence in the nominally higher qualifications of recent graduates. 
 One existing activity which exhibits potential for expansion is the use of the Sector 
Education Training Authority (STEA) Grant.  This grant provides financial backing for 
internships, apprenticeships, and learnships
10
 for workers entering or already working in the 
manufacturing industry.  The SETA grant supplements employer contributions to training 
programs.  This bypasses the otherwise necessary delegation of training to technical colleges, 
and instead allows employers to train employees directly, while not incurring the entirety of the 
costs.  Further, the same Irish Aid survey found that manufacturing firm employers have 
consistent access to these grants, and that the grants allow them to train “beyond their immediate 
company needs” (Irish Aid, 2015).  An expansion of support for this grant may help 
manufacturing firms prepare for the reskilling needs as technology prompts industry advances. 
                                                          
10
 A vocational learning program comprised of 1,200 hours of practical training experience in a trade, which leads 
to a qualification registered in South Africa’s National Qualifications Framework. 
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 Government and private sector cost-sharing initiatives for training and reskilling 
manufacturing employees is not new.  In addition to SETA grants, the 2015 IPAP announced a 
1.6 billion Rand investment in a South African Mercedes-Benz assembly plant’s equipment 
upgrades and the reskilling to complement the upgrades (Department of Trade and Industry, 
2015).  But if the manufacturing sector experiences net job losses, the government may consider 
supporting career-change grants in the same spirit of SETA.  For example, Autor and Dorn 
(2013) have linked losses in manufacturing jobs with the growth of the services industry.  A 
grant modeled off of the successful SETA grants that, instead of cost-sharing the upgrading of 
skills within sectors, provided cost-sharing for retaining between sectors could be of import to 
manufacturing workers displaced by automation.  This grant scheme could easily be targeted 
toward youth populations. 
Social Net Expansion 
 The last arena of policy suggestions exists in the domain of social welfare, and is the 
most controversial.  As stated earlier, it is unrealistic to expect that all of the labor within the 
manufacturing sector at present can be adequately retrained as the labor market changes, and that 
the net total of jobs proportional to the population will remain the same.  It is thus evident, in 
order to maintain the welfare of those displaced and unable to find similar work, that there must 
exist policies which embrace the needs of those left behind, should such a population manifest. 
 South Africa already has a well-established social grant system.  SWGs are meant to 
support the basic needs of individuals with certain circumstances that warrant government 
support to meet those needs.  There are six grant classes that determine eligibility for a SWG, 
namely: a grant for older persons, a disability grant, a war veteran’s grant, a foster child grant, a 
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care dependency grant, and a child support grant.  These grants range in value from 380 to 1,620 
Rand, all on a monthly basis (South African Social Security Agency, 2017). 
These grants have been shrouded in controversy in both political and private circles.  In 
response to controversy, Neves et al. (2009) conducted a large, mixed method investigation and 
published their findings in. “The use and effectiveness of social grants in South Africa.”  The 
qualitative component of this study built upon previous studies of the same nature, and the 
quantitative component conducted a propensity score matching analysis on QLFS statistics.  
There were a number of key findings.  The authors found that not only do social grants provide a 
fiscal safety net for those most vulnerable, but that social grants catalyze consumer activity.  
Such consumer activity has the effect of buttressing the informal market, as well, increasing net 
economic activity in the country by increasing transactions.  Further, the authors found that, 
compared to similar individuals not receiving social grants, those receiving them saved more and 
invested in production capacities at a higher rate. 
The above paper, however, is far from the only opinion or analysis.  Others such as 
Bhorat (2002) argue that an UBI in South Africa of merely 100 Rand a month would bankrupt 
the country.  Although it is outside the domain of this thesis to run an econometric analysis and 
determine a feasible financing scheme for expanding South Africa’s SWG system, it is evident 
that the social welfare landscape will have to respond to changes in society, and that part of this 
may be an expansion of SWG to embrace the needs of unemployed, young, Black/African, low-
skilled persons.  This demographic suffers from the highest levels of unemployment, and is 
consistent with the demographic most likely to be displaced by automation in the manufacturing 
sector, except that males are particularly vulnerable in manufacturing. 
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This alludes to a much broader social problem than that with which this thesis can 
address with the required degree of depth: unemployment among South African youth at large.  
The demographic most vulnerable to job displacement due to automation in the manufacturing 
sector, namely young, Black/African, low-skilled males, is thus a subset nested within a broader 
population that shares its demographic characteristics.  To devise a social welfare policy that 
only addresses the manufacturing subset of the unemployed, young, low-skilled South African 
demographic seems discriminatory in an unnecessary and imbalanced manner.  Any solution that 
aims to address unemployment among young, Black/African, low-skilled South Africans will 
thus, by default, address the demographic subset with which this thesis is mainly concerned.  To 
advise on social welfare policies that address this entire population is outside of the purview of 
this thesis.  Those not able to be reskilled, or whose jobs are not protected by the preceding two 
policy suggestion areas, will ultimately fall into a broader category of unemployed, 
Black/African, low-skilled youth.  Continued research is required to explore policies to 
accommodate the needs of this broader demographic, but an expansion of the SWG scheme 
should reside at the core of such research. 
Conclusion 
 The South African government expressly considers its manufacturing sector to be both a 
source of future employment for its citizens and an integral driver of the nation’s economy.  
Although these objectives appear to run parallel to one another at first glance, moving into the 
twenty-first century, further scrutiny begins to reveal future deviation in their respective 
trajectories.  The same advances that can keep the manufacturing sector competitive and 
producing wealth for the South African economy threaten to displace low and semi-skilled 
laborers.  In the United States, for example, from 2004 to 2014, manufacturing output in dollars 
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increased 0.7 percent annually on average.  This increase in output ran in concert with a -1.6 
annual rate of decrease in employment, resulting in two million lost jobs (U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2015). 
The South African government appears not to recognize this trend away from low-
skilled, labor-intensive employment.  The Department of Trade and Industry stated in its 2015 
IPAP: 
“The manufacturing sector is critical to sustainable growth, as set out in all 
previous iterations of IPAP. The undeniable, repeatedly demonstrated facts are 
that manufacturing has the highest growth and employment multipliers of all the 
economic sectors…” 
 
After breaking down the South African manufacturing sector into ten sub-sectors, this thesis 
assigned a high, medium, or low potential for each sub-sector to see integration of labor-
displacing automation into its production lines.  It also assigned a priority level of each sub-
sector to the sector’s vitality as a whole.  It was found that 75 percent of the total manufacturing 
labor force is employed in high priority sub-sectors that are highly vulnerable to automation.  By 
breaking down the South African labor force’s socio-demographic characteristics, it was found 
that the most vulnerable population to job-displacing automation in the manufacturing sector is 
young, low-skilled, Black/African males. 
 Three classes of policy suggestions follow from this analysis.  The first policy suggestion 
area pertains to protecting the sector’s competitiveness internationally.  The second proposes 
policy options to support employee retraining and skill upgrading.  The third policy suggestion 
area is concerned with buttressing South Africa’s social safety net in order to accommodate for 
potential job-displaced persons who do not find alternate employment. 
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 Although the future of the relationship between automation and labor is shrouded in bitter 
disagreements, Delphic prophesies, naïve optimism, and tired cynicism, the trend toward the 
integration of automation technology into manufacturing production lines and process chains is 
undeniable, and South Africa is not exempt.  It may not be possible to precisely predict the 
employment figures in decades to come, but it is as obvious that South Africa’s job-creation 
plans are flawed, as it is necessary that the nation revisits its industrial policies.  Political 
interests that promise jobs in labor-intensive industry should be viewed with suspicion.  Only by 
being realistic about the future of labor in the South African manufacturing sector can the nation 
deliver effective policies to simultaneously promote employment and the vitality of the sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
REFERENCES 
ABB Robotics. (2010). Burlington Automation Case Study: Metal Fabrication. Retrieved  
December 13, 2017, from https://library.e.abb.com/public/460acf14c5e6e0cec1257 
7c7002f5f62/burlington_casestudy_en_print.pdf. 
 
Altman, M. (2013). Industrial Strategy, Offshoring, and Employment Promotion in South Africa.  
In The Oxford Handbook of Offshoring and Global Employment. New York: Oxford  
University Press. 
 
Arntz, M., T. Gregory and U. Zierahn (2016), “The Risk of Automation for Jobs in OECD  
Countries: A Comparative Analysis”, OECD Social, Employment and Migration  
Working Papers, No. 189, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1787/5jlz9h56dvq7-en 
 
Autor, D. (2014). Skills, education, and the rise of earnings inequality among the "other 99  
percent." Science, 344(6186), 843-851. doi:10.1126/science.1251868 
 
Autor, D. (2015). Paradox of Abundance. Performance and Progress, 237-260. doi:10.1093/ 
acprof:oso/9780198744283.003.0017 
 
Autor, D., & Dorn, D. (2013). The Growth of Low Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the  
U.S. Labor Market. The American Economic Review. doi:10.3386/w15150 
 
Autor, D., Katz, L., & Krueger, A. (1998). Computing Inequality: Have Computers Changed the  
Labor Market? The Quarterly Journal of Economics. doi:10.3386/w5956 
 
Autor, D., Levy, F., & Murnane, R. (2003). The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change:  
An Empirical Exploration. Quarterly Journal of Economics. doi:10.3386/w8337 
 
Badishkanian, G., Lai, A., Shirvaikar, A., Bazinet, J., Lehto, T., Wightman, F., Chang, A.,  
Mcshane, K., Wong, K., Fordham, T., Pritchard, W., Rogers, S. (2016, 
January). Technology at Work v2.0: the future is not what it used to be. Retrieved 
September 24, 2017, from Citigroup website: http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/ 
downloads/reports/Citi_GPS_Technology_Work_2.pdf 
 
Barbosa, G. F., Cordeiro, E. C., & Costa, F. R. (2015). Systems and Methods for Manufacturing  
Aircraft Furniture Parts Using an Integrated Automated Cell. SAE Technical Paper  
Series. doi:10.4271/2015-01-2600 
 
Benzell, S., Kotlikoff, L., Lagarda, G., & Sachs, J. (2015). Robots Are Us: Some Economics of  
Human Replacement. doi:10.3386/w20941 
 
Bhorat, H. (2002). A Universal Income Grant Scheme for South Africa: An Empirical  
Assessment. Retrieved October 31, 2017, from https://s3.amazonaws.com/ 
academia.edu.documents/30807765/2002Bhorat.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWY 
YGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1509460123&Signature=oVMZyuDRZb5Htc1G1Sy 
 
 
73 
 
YjxOF%2BeM%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DA_ 
universal_grant_scheme_for_South_Afric.pdf. 
 
Bhorat, H. and Rooney, C. (2017). “State of Manufacturing in South Africa”. Development  
Policy Research Unit Working Paper 201702. DPRU, University of Cape Town. 
 
Bhorat, H., Naidoo, K., Oosthuizen, M., & Pillay, K. (2016). Demographic, employment, and  
wage trends in South Africa. Understanding the African Lions. Retrieved November 6,  
2017, from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/06-demographic- 
employment-wage-trends-south-africa.pdf. 
 
Black, S., & Spitz-Oener, A. (2007). Explaining Womens Success: Technological Change and  
the Skill Content of Womens Work. doi:10.3386/w13116 
 
Blinder, A. S. (2006). Offshoring: The Next Industrial Revolution? Foreign Affairs, 85(2).  
doi:10.2307/20031915 
 
Brand, J. E. (2015). The Far-Reaching Impact of Job Loss and Unemployment. Annual Review of  
Sociology, 41(1), 359-375. doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-071913-043237 
 
Brynjolfsson, E., & McAfee, A. (2012). Race Against The Machine: How The Digital  
Revolution Is Accelerating Innovation, Driving Productivity, and Irreversibly  
Transforming Employment and The Economy. The MIT Center for Digital Business.  
Retrieved September 25, 2017, from http://ebusiness.mit.edu/research/Briefs/ 
Brynjolfsson_McAfee_Race_Against_the_Machine.pdf 
 
Burgard, S. A., Brand, J. E., & House, J. S. (2007). Toward a Better Estimation of the Effect of  
Job Loss on Health. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 48(4), 369-384. doi:10.1177/ 
002214650704800403 
 
Case, A., & Deaton, A. (2015). Rising morbidity and mortality in midlife among white non- 
Hispanic Americans in the 21st centur. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences  
of the United States of America, 112(49). doi:10.1073/pnas.1518393112 
 
Chang, J., & Huynh, P. (2016). ASEAN in transformation : the future of jobs at risk of  
automation (Publication). International Labour Organization. 
 
Deaton Engineering. (2017). Deaton Drives Efficiency for Honda Facility. Retrieved December  
12, 2017, from http://www.deatonengineering.com/pdfs/case_studies/honda.pdf 
 
Deloitte. (2016.) 2016 Global Manufacturing Competitiveness Index. London:  
Deloitte. 
 
Deloitte. (2013). Enhancing Manufacturing competitiveness in South Africa. Retrieved  
September 29, 2017, from Deloitte website: www.deloitte.co.za 
 
 
 
74 
 
Demombynes, G., & Özler, B. (2005). Crime and Local Inequality in South Africa. Journal of  
Development Economics. 
 
Elamvazuthi, I., Kamaruddin, S., & Azm, M. S. (2009). Automation of Nesting and Cutting  
Processes of Leather Furniture Production: A Case Study. International Journal of  
Mechanical & Mechatronics Engineering, 9(10). Retrieved December 12, 2017, from  
http://www.ijens.org/96910-8383%20IJMME-IJENS.pdf 
 
Eliason, M., & Storrie, D. (2006). Lasting or Latent Scars? Swedish Evidence on the Long‐Term  
Effects of Job Displacement. Journal of Labor Economics, 24(4), 831-856.  
doi:10.1086/506487 
 
Emerson Industrial Automation. (2015). Metal Applications. Retrieved December 13, 2017, from  
http://www.emersonindustrial.com/enEN/documentcenter/Emerson%20IA%20Automatio 
n%20Solutions%20Documents/Brochures/metals-brochure-EN.pdf 
 
Frey, C. B., & Osborne, M. A. (2017). The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to  
computerisation? Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 114, 254-280.  
doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2016.08.019 
 
Friedman, M., & Friedman, R. D. (1982). Capitalism and Freedom : Fortieth Anniversary  
Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Gereffi, G., & Fernandez-Stark, K. (2010). The Offshore Services Value Chain : Developing  
Countries And The Crisis. Policy Research Working Papers. doi:10.1596/1813-9450- 
5262 
 
Gorlach, I. A., & Wessel, O. (2007). Case Study: Automation Strategies at Volkswagen. 2.  
doi:10.7166/19-1-112 
 
Goos, M., Manning, A., & Salomons, A. (2009). Job Polarization in Europe. American Economic  
Review, 99(2), 58-63. doi:10.1257/aer.99.2.58 
 
Hagedorn-Hansen, D., Steenkamp, L., Hagedorn-Hansen, E., & Oosthuizen, G. (2017).  
Investigating the Effects of Automating Process Chains towards Sustainable  
Manufacturing in South Africa. Procedia Manufacturing, 7, 262-268.  
doi:10.1016/j.promfg.2016.12.062 
 
Hart, D. J., & Lifton, W. M. (1958). Of Things to Come --AUTOMATION AND  
COUNSELING. Personnel & Guidance Journal, 37(4), 282-286. 
 
Hemous, D., & Olsen, M. (2016). The Rise of the Machines: Automation, Horizontal Innovation  
and Income Inequality. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2328774 
 
Hunter, S. L. (2008). The Toyota Production System Applied to the Upholstery Furniture  
Manufacturing Industry. Materials and Manufacturing Processes, 23(7), 629-634.  
 
 
75 
 
doi:10.1080/10426910802316476 
 
Irish Aid. (2015). Producing Opportunity: A Youth Labor Market Assessment in South Africa’s  
Manufacturing Industry. International Youth Foundation. Retrieved December 21, 2017, 
from https://www.iyfnet.org/sites/default/files/library/IrishAid_SouthAfricaLMA.pdf. 
 
Jaimovich, N., & Siu, H. (2012). The Trend is the Cycle: Job Polarization and Jobless  
Recoveries. doi:10.3386/w18334 
 
Jämsä-Jounela, S. (2007). Future trends in process automation. Annual Reviews in  
Control, 31(2), 211-220. doi:10.1016/j.arcontrol.2007.08.003 
 
Kaplan, D. (2004). South Africa’s National Research and Development Strategy: A Review (2nd  
ed., Vol. 9, Rep.). Science and Technology Society. 
 
Katz, L. F., & Autor, D. H. (1999). Changes in the Wage Structure and Earnings  
Inequality. Handbook of Labor Economics, 1463-1555. doi:10.1016/s1573- 
4463(99)03007-2 
 
Kirkegaard, J. F. (2007). Offshoring, Outsourcing, and Production Relocation - Labor-Market  
Effects in the OECD Countries and Developing Asia. SSRN Electronic Journal.  
doi:10.2139/ssrn.988067 
 
Kreuser, F., & Newman, C. (2016). Total factor productivity in South African manufacturing  
firms. United Nations University. Retrieved November 12, 2017, from  
https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2016-41.pdf. 
 
Koivo, H. N. (2009). Automation And Control in Pulp and Paper Processes. In Control Systems,  
Robotics, and Automation. Retrieved December 14, 2017, from  
http://www.eolss.net/sample-chapters/c18/e6-43-34-05.pdf 
 
John Maynard Keynes, “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren (1930),” in Essays in  
Persuasion (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1932), 358-373 
 
Killingsworth, C. (1962). Industrial Relations and Automation. American Academy of Political  
and Social Science, 340. Retrieved September 24, 2017, from  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/103370 
 
Landscheidt, S., Kans, M., & Winroth, M. (2017). Opportunities for Robotic Automation in  
Wood Product Industries: The Supplier and System Integrators’ Perspective. Procedia  
Manufacturing, 11, 233-240. doi:10.1016/j.promfg.2017.07.231 
 
Leopold, T. A., Ratcheva, V., & Zahidi, S. (2016). The Future of Jobs Employment, Skills and  
Workforce Strategy for the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Rep.). World Economic Forum. 
 
Lorenz, M., Rüßmann, M., Strack, R., Lueth, K. L., & Bolle, M. (2015, September). Man and  
 
 
76 
 
Machine in Industry 4.0 (Publication). Retrieved October 16, 2017, from The Boston  
Consulting Group website: http://englishbulletin.adapt.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 
10/BCG_Man_and_Machine_in_Industry_4_0_Sep_2015_tcm80-197250.pdf 
 
Luddite. (2013). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved October 16, 2017, from  
https://www.britannica.com/event/Luddite 
 
Mahalik, N. P., & Nambiar, A. N. (2010). Trends in food packaging and manufacturing systems  
and technology. Trends in Food Science & Technology, 21(3), 117-128.  
doi:10.1016/j.tifs.2009.12.006 
 
Makgetla, N. (2014). Manufacturing employment and equality in South Africa (Working paper).  
TIPS. 
 
Makino, K. (2004). Social security policy reform in post-apartheid South Africa: a focus on the  
basic income grant. Durban: Centre for Civil Society. 
 
Manufacturing-circle. (2009). Retrieved November 13, 2017, from  
https://www.manufacturingcircle.co.za/ 
 
Manyika, J., Chui, M., Miremadi, M., Bughin, J., George, K., Wilmott, P., & Dewhurst, M.  
(2017). A Future that Works: Automation, Employment, and Productivity. McKinsey  
Global Institute. 
 
Matisonn, H., & Seekings, J. (2002). Welfare in Wonderland? The Politics of Basic Income  
Grant in South Africa, 1996-2002. Retrieved October 31, 2017, from  
http://basicincome.org/bien/pdf/2002MatisonnSeekings.pdf 
 
Maverick Technologies. (2008). Major Petroleum Refinery Converts to New Digital Automation  
System. Retrieved December 14, 2017, from http://www.mavtechglobal.com/ 
resources/pdfs/case-studies/refinery-converts-digital-automation.pdf 
 
merSETA. (2010). The Impact of the 2008/9 Global Economic Crisis on merSETA Firms: A  
Focus on Employment and Skills, Johannesburg: Manufacturing, Engineering and  
Related Services SETA. Retrieved December 21, 2017, from  
http://www.lmip.org.za/sites/default/files/documentfiles/THE%20IMPACT%20OF%20T 
HE%202008%20to%202009%20%20GLOBAL%20ECONOMIC.pdf 
 
Meyer, A. D., Nakane, J., Miller, J. G., & Ferdows, K. (1989). Flexibility: The next competitive  
battle the manufacturing futures survey. Strategic Management Journal, 10(2), 135-144.  
doi:10.1002/smj.4250100204 
 
Millington, K. A. (2017). How Changes in Technology and Automation will Affect the Labour  
Market in Africa. K4D Helpdesk Report. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development  
Studies. 
 
 
 
77 
 
Mondada, F., Bonnet, E., Davrajh, S., Johal, W., & Stopforth, R. (2016). R2T2. International  
Journal of Advanced Robotic Systems, 13(5), 172988141665816.  
doi:10.1177/1729881416658165 
 
Moyo, D. (2010). Dead aid: why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa.  
London: Penguin Books. 
 
Nakker, R., & Allopi, D. (2015, October). Improving performance at the Durban Container  
Terminal through automation (Publication). Retrieved October 16, 2017, from  
https://ir.dut.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10321/2370/Naicker_CE_v23_n9_a17_2015.pdf?seq 
uence=1&isAllowed=y 
 
Neves, D., Samson, M., Niekerk, I. V., Hlatshwayo, S., & Toit, A. D. (2009). The use and  
effectiveness of social grants in South Africa. Economic Policy Research Institute. 
 
Nof, S. Y. (2009). Springer handbook of automation with DVD-ROM and 149 tables. Berlin:  
Springer. 
 
Nordhaus, W. (2005). The Sources of the Productivity Rebound and the Manufacturing  
Employment Puzzle. National Bureau of Economic Research. doi:10.3386/w11354 
 
OECD. (2015). Securing livelihoods for all: foresight for action. Chapter 3. Paris: OECD. 
 
Parker, J. K., Dubey, R., Paul, F. W., & Becker, R. J. (1983). Robotic Fabric Handling for  
Automating Garment Manufacturing. Journal of Engineering for Industry, 105(1), 21. 
doi:10.1115/1.3185859 
 
Parasuraman, R., & Riley, V. (1997). Humans and Automation: Use, Misuse, Disuse, and  
Abuse. Human Factors, 39(2), 230-253. Retrieved October 2, 2017, from  
http://web.mit.edu/16.459/www/parasuraman.pdf 
 
Parijs, P. V. (2004). Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the Twenty-first  
Century. Politics & Society, 32. doi:10.1177/0032329203261095 
 
Pieter le Roux (2002) Financing a universal income grant in South Africa, Social Dynamics,  
28:2, 98-121, DOI: 10.1080/02533950208458734 
 
Pew Research Center. (2014, August 6). AI, Robotics, and the Future of Jobs(Publication).  
Retrieved October 16, 2017, from Pew Research Center website:  
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/08/06/future-of-jobs/ 
 
Phoenix Contact. (2013). Automation of the car body assembly line for the new Audi A3.  
Retrieved December 12, 2017, from https://www.phoenixcontact.com/ 
assets/downloads_ed/local_us/web_dwl_promotion/Audi_Case_Study.pdf. 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. (2010). Offshoring in the manufacturing  
 
 
78 
 
industry. PricewaterhouseCoopers. Retrieved November 12, 2017, from 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/outsourcing-shared-services-centers/assets/offshoring-in-the-
manufacturing-industry.pdf. 
 
Ramulongo, T. (2015). Analysis of Underemployment in the South Africa Labour Market.  
Department of Labour. 
 
Rankin, N. (2001). The Export Behaviour of South African Manufacturing Firms. Trade and  
Industry Policy Strategies. Retrieved November 12, 2017, from  
http://tips.org.za/files/The_Export_Behaviour_of_South_African_Manufacturing_Firms. 
pdf 
 
Raphael, S., & Winter-Ebmer, R. (1999). Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on  
Crime. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.145790 
 
Reich, R. (2017, September 29). Why We'll Need a Universal Basic Income. Retrieved  
October 23, 2017, from http://robertreich.org/post/151111696805 
 
Roberts, S. (2006). Sustainable manufacturing?: the case of South Africa and Ekurhuleni. Cape  
Town, South Africa: Juta. 
 
Robotics-VO, 2013. A Roadmap for US Robotics. From Internet to Robotics. 2013, Robotics in  
the United States of America. 
 
Rockwell Automation. (2017). Enfasi Stands Out in the Pulp and Paper Industry. Retrieved  
December 14, 2017, from https://www.rockwellautomation.com/global/news/case- 
studies/detail.page?pagetitle=Pulp-and-Paper-Industry-%7C-Case- 
Study&content_type=casestudy&docid=7517314275114e91a41f72c55443804c 
 
Rodrik, D. (2015). Premature Deindustrialization. Princeton, NJ: School of Social  
Sciences. Retrieved September 25, 2017, from https://link.springer.com/article/ 
10.1007/s10887-015-9122-3 
 
Rodrik, D. (2006). Understanding South Africa’s Economic Puzzles. National Bureau of  
Economic Research. doi:10.3386/w12565 
 
Rowthorn, R., & Ramaswamy, R. (1997). Deindustrialization: Its Causes and  
Implications. A Working Paper of the International Monetary Fund. Retrieved September  
29, 2017 
 
Rudyka, R. I., Zingerman, Y. E., & Lavrov, K. G. (2009). Trends in the automation of coke  
production. Coke and Chemistry, 52(7), 329-334. doi:10.3103/s1068364x09070138 
 
Sachs, J., & Kotlikoff, L. (2012). Smart Machines and Long-Term Misery. doi:10.3386/w18629 
 
Sachs, J., Benzell, S., & Lagarda, G. (2015). Robots: Curse or Blessing? A Basic Framework.  
 
 
79 
 
doi:10.3386/w21091 
 
Sako, Mari. (November 28, 2005). Outsourcing and Offshoring: Key Trends and Issues.  
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1463480 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ 
ssrn.1463480 
 
Sander, D. (1986). New Automation Trends in the Furniture Industry. IFAC Proceedings  
Volumes, 19(12), 13-17. doi:10.1016/s1474-6670(17)59580-4 
 
Sayer, L. (2016). Inequality in an increasingly automated world. Retrieved September 24, 2017,  
from World Social Science Report website: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/ 
0024/002458/245863e.pdf 
 
Schleipen, M., & Drath, R. (2009). Three-view-concept for modeling process or manufacturing  
plants with AutomationML. 2009 IEEE Conference on Emerging Technologies &  
Factory Automation. doi:10.1109/etfa.2009.5347260 
 
Schneider, G. E. (2000). The Development of the Manufacturing Sector in South Africa. Journal  
of Economic Issues, 34(2), 413–424. 
 
Scutchfield, F. D., & Keck, C. W. (2017). Deaths of despair: Why? what to do?American  
Journal of Public Health, 107(10), 1564-1565. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.2105/ 
AJPH.2017.303992 
 
Seedat, M., Niekerk, A. V., Jewkes, R., Suffla, S., & Ratele, K. (2009). Violence and injuries in  
South Africa: prioritising an agenda for prevention. The Lancet, 374(9694), 1011-1022.  
doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(09)60948-x 
 
Siemens. (2004). Glass Focus: ideas for glass production and glass machinery. Retrieved  
December 13, 2017, from https://www.industry.siemens.com/verticals/global/en/ 
glass/Documents/GlassFocus_2004_e.pdf?ismobile=true. 
 
Söderbom, M., & Teal, F. (2003). How can policy towards manufacturing in Africa reduce  
poverty? A review of the current evidence from cross-country firm studies. Centre for the  
Study of African Economies, University of Oxford. Retrieved October 4, 2017. 
 
South Africa, Department of Labour. (2016). Annual Report Department of Labour 2015/2016.  
Pretoria. 
 
South Africa, Department of Labour. (2017). Annual Report Department of Labour 2016/2017.  
Pretoria. 
 
South Africa, Department of Science and Technology. (2002). A National Advanced  
Manufacturing Technology Strategy for South Africa. Pretoria. 
 
South Africa, Department of Science and Technology. (2007). Innovation Towards a  
 
 
80 
 
Knowledge-Based Economy: Ten-Year Plan for South Africa . 
 
South Africa, Department of The Presidency. (2012). Our Future- make it work: National  
Development Plan 2030 Executive Summary. National Planning Commission. 
 
South Africa, Department of Trade and Industry. (2015). The Department of Trade and Industry  
Industrial Policy Action Plan 2015. Pretoria. 
 
South Africa, Department of Trade and Industry. (2017). The DTI Annual Report, 2016/17.  
Pretoria. 
 
South African Social Security Agency. (2017). You and Your Grants 2017/18. Retrieved  
December 31, 2017, from South African Social Security Agency website:  
https://africacheck.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/english-you-and-your-grants-2017-
18-final.pdf 
 
Srour, Ilina, Erol Taymaz, and Marco Vivarelli. (2013). Skill-Biased Technological Change and  
Skill Enhancing Trade in Turkey: Evidence from Longitudinal Microdata. IZA  
Discussion Paper 7320, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn. 
 
Statistics South Africa a. (2017). Quarterly financial statistics June 2017. Retrieved  
October 3, 2017, from Statistics South Africa website: http://www.statssa.gov.za/ 
publications/P0044/P0044June2017.pdf 
 
Statistics South Africa b. (2017). Quarterly Labor Force Survey Quarter 2: 2017. Retrieved  
October 3, 2017, from Statistics South Africa website: 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/ 
P0211/P02112ndQuarter2017.pdf 
 
Statistics South Africa c. (2017, August 22). Poverty Trends in South Africa: An examination of  
absolute poverty between 2006 & 2015. Retrieved October 18, 2017, from  
http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10341 
 
Statistics South Africa d. (2017). Manufacturing: Production and sales (Preliminary) July 2017.  
Retrieved October 3, 2017, from Statistics South Africa website:  
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P30412/P30412July2017.pdf 
 
Statistics South Africa e. (2017). Manufacturing: Utilisation of production capacity by large 
enterprises (Preliminary). Retrieved November 6, 2017, from http://www.statssa.gov.za/ 
publications/P3043/P3043May2017.pdf 
 
Statistics South Africa f. (2016). Community Survey 2016. Retrieved October 3, 2017, from  
Statistics South Africa website: http://cs2016.statssa.gov.za/wp- 
content/uploads/2016/07/NT-30-06-2016 RELEASE-for-CS-2016-_Statistical-releas_1-
July-2016.pdf 
 
 
 
81 
 
Statistics South Africa g. (2016). Annual Financial Statistics. Retrieved November 6, 2017, from  
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0021/P00212015.pdf 
 
Statistics South Africa h. (2017). East London Industrial Development Zone Survey, 2015.  
Retrieved November 6, 2017, from http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-00-30- 
00/Report-00-30-002015.pdf 
 
Statistics South Africa i. (2016). Manufacturing industry: Financial, 2014. Retrieved November  
6, 2017, from http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-30-02-03/Report-30-02- 
032014.pdf 
 
Statistics South Africa j. (2016). Manufacturing industry: Production, 2014. Retrieved November  
6, 2017, from http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-30-02-04/Report-30-02- 
042014.pdf 
 
Suzuki, K. (1993). R&D spillovers and technology transfer among and within vertical keiretsu  
groups. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 11(4), 573-591.  
doi:10.1016/0167-7187(93)90026-9 
 
Strebel, A., Crawford, M., Shefer, T., Cloete, A., Dwadwa-Henda, N., Kaufman, M., . . .  
Kalichman, S. (2006). Social constructions of gender roles, gender-based violence and  
HIV/AIDS in two communities of the Western Cape, South Africa. SAHARA-J: Journal 
of Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS, 3(3), 516-528. doi:10.1080/17290376.2006.9724879 
 
Stom, Bengt. (2008, March 19). ABB helps automate global furniture industry. ABB Robotics.   
Retrieved December 12, 2017, from https://library.e.abb.com/public/ 
93e5aae66254eb7fc12574c5003deaa9/ABB%20helps%20automate%20global%20furnitu 
re%20industry.pdf 
 
Sullivan, D., & Wachter, T. V. (2009). Job Displacement and Mortality: An Analysis Using  
Administrative Data*. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3), 1265-1306.  
doi:10.1162/qjec.2009.124.3.1265 
 
Surender, R., Noble, M., Wright, G., & Ntshongwana, P. (2010). Social Assistance and  
Dependency in South Africa: An Analysis of Attitudes to Paid Work and Social  
Grants. Journal of Social Policy, 39(02), 203. doi:10.1017/s0047279409990638 
 
Torgerson, E., & Paul, F. (1988). Vision-guided robotic fabric manipulation for apparel  
manufacturing. IEEE Control Systems Magazine, 8(1), 14-20. doi:10.1109/37.463 
 
OECD. (2015, July). South Africa Policy Brief Education and Skills. Retrieved September 27,  
2017, from OECD website: https://www.oecd.org/education/south-africa-improving-
quality-and-relevance-of-skills.pdf 
 
UNCTAD. (2016, October). Robots and Industrialization in Developing Countries. Retrieved  
October 11, 2017, from UNCTAD website: http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ 
 
 
82 
 
presspb2016d6_en.pdf 
 
United Nations Statistics Division. (2017) United Nations Statistics Division - Classifications  
Registry. Retrieved December 12, 2017, from https://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/ 
registry/regcst.asp?Cl=17&Lg=1 
 
United States, Congress, Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization. (1955). AUTOMATION AND  
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (p.53). 
 
United States, Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2015, December). Industry  
Employment and Output Projections to 2024. Retrieved September 28, 2017, from  
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2015/article/industry-employment-and-output-projections-
to-2024.htm#BLS_table_footnotes 
 
United States, Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2017). Retrieved October 17,  
2017, from https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 
 
Vitkova, E., & Hajek, V. (2016). Optimization of costs related to production of small electric  
machines. 2016 International Symposium on Power Electronics, Electrical Drives,  
Automation and Motion (SPEEDAM). doi:10.1109/speedam.2016.7525866 
 
Vogel-Heuser, B. (2009). Automation in the Wood and Paper Industry. In Springer Handbook of  
Automation. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78831- 
7_58 
 
Wilkinson, K. (2017). FACTSHEET: Unemployment statistics in SA explained. Retrieved  
October 31, 2017, from https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-unemployment- 
statistics-in-south-africa-explained/ 
 
Wilkinson, R., Kawachi, I., & Kennedy, B. (1998). Mortality, the social environment, crime and  
violence. Sociology of Health & Illness, 20(5). 
 
Williams, G., Cunningham, S., & De Beer, D. (2014). Advanced Manufacturing and Jobs in  
South Africa: An Examination of Perceptions and Trends . Johannesburg. Retrieved  
September 26, 2017, from http://www.tips.org.za/files/advanced_manufacturing_and_ 
jobs_in_south_africa_140301_williams_cunninham_de_beer_0.pdf 
 
Wispelaere, J. D., & Stirton, L. (2004). The Many Faces of Universal Basic Income. The  
Political Quarterly, 75(3), 266-274. doi:10.1111/j.1467-923x.2004.00611.x 
 
Wispelaere, J. D., & Stirton, L. (2012). A disarmingly simple idea? Practical bottlenecks in the  
implementation of a universal basic income. International Social Security Review, 65(2),  
103-121. doi:10.1111/j.1468-246x.2012.01430.x 
 
The World Bank. (2011). World development report 2011: conflict, security, and development.  
Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
 
 
83 
 
 
The World Bank. (2016). World Development Report 2016 Digital Dividends. Washington  
DC: The World Bank. doi: 10.1596/978-1-4648-0671-1 
 
The World Bank. (2017, May 3). The World Bank in South Africa. Retrieved October 16, 2017,  
from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview 
 
World Economic Forum. (2015). Global Risks 2015: 10th Edition (Publication). Retrieved  
October 31, 2017, from World Economic Forum website: http://www3.weforum.org/ 
docs/WEF_Global_Risks_2015_Report15.pdf 
 
World Economic Forum. (2017). Technology and Innovation for the Future of Production:  
Accelerating Value Creation. World Economic Forum. 
 
